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ABSTRACT
The traditional access control system suffers from the problem of separation of data
ownership and management. It poses data security issues in application scenarios
such as cloud computing and blockchain where the data owners either do not trust
the data storage provider or even do not know who would have access to their data
once they are appended to the chain. In these scenarios, the data owner actually loses
control of the data once they are uploaded to the outside storage. Encryption-before-
uploading is the way to solve this issue, however traditional encryption schemes such
as AES, RSA, ECC, bring about great overheads in key management on the data
owner end and could not provide fine-grained access control as well.
Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) is a cryptographic way to implement attribute-
based access control, which is a fine-grained access control model, thus solving all
aforementioned issues. With ABE, the data owner would encrypt the data by a self-
defined access control policy before uploading the data. The access control policy is
an AND-OR boolean formula over attributes. Only users with attributes that satisfy
the access control policy could decrypt the ciphertext. However the existing ABE
schemes do not provide some important features in practical applications, e.g., user
revocation and attribute expiration. Furthermore, most existing work focus on how
to use ABE to protect cloud stored data, while not the blockchain applications.
The main objective of this thesis is to provide solutions to add two important
features of the ABE schemes, i.e., user revocation and attribute expiration, and also
provide a practical trust framework for using ABE to protect blockchain data. To
add the feature of user revocation, I propose to add user’s hierarchical identity into
the private attribute key. In this way, only users whose identity is not revoked and
attributes satisfy the access control policy could decrypt the ciphertext. To add the
feature of attribute expiration, I propose to add the attribute valid time period into
i
the private attribute key. The data would be encrypted by access control policy
where all attributes have a temporal value. In this way, only users whose attributes
both satisfy the access policy and at the same time these attributes do not expire,
are allowed to decrypt the ciphertext. To use ABE in the blockchain applications,
I propose an ABE-enabled trust framework in a very popular blockchain platform,
Hyperledger Fabric. Based on the design, I implement a light-weight attribute cer-
tificate authority for attribute distribution and validation; I implement the proposed
ABE schemes and provide a toolkit which supports system setup, key generation,
data encryption and data decryption. All these modules were integrated into a demo
system for protecting sensitive files in a blockchain application.
ii
DEDICATION
To my family for their love and support.
iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
At first I would like to thank my advisor, Dr. Dijiang Huang, for all his advising
and support during my study at ASU. He provided me unreserved help in research.
The study and work experience in the lab is very important and helpful to me. I also
would like to thank the committee members of my thesis, Dr. Arunabha Sen and Dr.
Adam Doupe´. Thanks for your valuable feedback and suggestions.
Thanks my lab mates: Dr. Chun-Jen Chung, Dr. Weijia Wang, Yuli Deng, for all
the valuable discussions.
Members of our Secure Networking And Computing (SNAC) Lab provided me a
lot of inspiring ideas by ways of group meetings and discussions. Thanks Abdulhakim
Sabur, Dr. Adel Alshamrani, Ankur Chowdhary, Dr. Bing Li, Duo Lu, Dr. Jiayue
Li, Dr. Sandeep Pisharody, Sowmya Myneni and Zhen Zeng, for all the valuable
discussions and suggestions.
Thanks my academic advisor Christina Sebring and Arzuhan Kavak, for all your
help, timely replies and kindness.
Thanks our friends Fred Morstatter and Rio Cavendish, for helping us settle down
here. Without you guys, our life here could not be so enjoyable.
Finally, I would like to thank my parents for their unconditional love and constant
support. To my sister for taking care of our parents during my study here, for her
unconditional love and support all through my life. To my husband, for all the
encouragements and understandings — you are both a great family member and my
best friend. To our ginger fluffy roommate Frankie, for making me happy.
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x
LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
CHAPTER
1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2 Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.3 Thesis Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2 RELATED WORK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.1 Access Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.1.1 Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.1.2 Access Control Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2 Attribute-Based Access Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.2.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.2.2 Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.2.3 Benefits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.3 Attribute-Based Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.3.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.3.2 Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.3.3 Benefits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.4 Blockchain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.4.1 Bitcoin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.4.2 The Blockchain Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.4.3 Blockchain Classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3 ABE PRELIMINARIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
v
CHAPTER Page
3.1 Mathematical Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.1.1 Group and Cyclic Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.1.2 Prime Order Bilinear Pairing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.1.3 Composite Order Bilinear Pairing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.2 Access Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.2.1 Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.2.2 Linear Secret Sharing Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.2.3 Conversion Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.2.4 Access Structure Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4 USER REVOCATION IN ABE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4.1.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4.1.2 Existing Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
4.2 System and Security Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
4.2.1 Identity Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
4.2.2 System Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
4.2.3 Framework of Data Access Control Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
4.2.4 Security Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4.3 Attribute-Based Access Control with Discretionary Revocation . . . . . 43
4.3.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4.3.2 Proposed Access Control System Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4.4 Analysis and Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4.4.1 Security Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4.4.2 Performance Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
vi
CHAPTER Page
4.4.3 Implementation and Testing Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
5 EXTENDED ABE SCHEME SUPPORTING FEDERATION, DELE-
GATION AND INTER-OPERABILITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
5.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
5.1.1 A Motivation Use Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
5.1.2 Design Features and Solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
5.2 System and Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
5.2.1 DC-ABAC Trust Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
5.2.2 Security Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
5.3 DC-ABAC Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
5.3.1 Global Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
5.3.2 Federated Setup and Key Generation Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
5.3.3 Key Generation Delegation Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
5.3.4 Interoperability Within and Between Organization . . . . . . . . . 76
5.3.5 Identity Revocable Data Sharing and Access Protocol . . . . . . 77
5.4 Analysis and Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
5.4.1 Complexity Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
5.4.2 Security Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
5.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
6 AUTOMATIC ATTRIBUTE EXPIRATION IN ABE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
6.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
6.2 System and Trust Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
6.3 Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
vii
CHAPTER Page
6.3.1 Forward/Backward Derivation Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
6.4 The Proposed Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
6.4.1 Scheme Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
6.4.2 Security Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
6.4.3 Construction Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
6.4.4 Scheme Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
6.5 Analysis and Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
6.5.1 Security Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
6.5.2 Performance Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
6.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
7 DISCRETIONARY ATTRIBUTE-BASED ACCESS CONTROL IN HY-
PERLEDGER FABRIC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
7.1 Hyperledger Fabric . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
7.1.1 Terminology Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
7.1.2 Identity Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
7.1.3 System Workflow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
7.2 Trust Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
7.3 Attribute-Based Access Control in Hyperledger Fabric . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
7.4 ABE-based ABAC in Hyperledger Fabric . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
7.4.1 ABE Toolkit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
7.4.2 Hybrid Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
7.4.3 Attribute Validation Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
7.4.4 ABE in Chaincode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
7.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
viii
CHAPTER Page
8 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
ix
LIST OF TABLES
Table Page
4.1 Computation Complexity Comparison in terms of the Number of Pair-
ing Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4.2 Computation Complexity Comparison in terms of the Number of Ex-
ponentiation Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4.3 Storage Overhead Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4.4 Communication Overhead Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
5.1 Notations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
5.2 Complexity Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
x
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure Page
1.1 CP-ABE Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1 Three Steps for a Subject to Access an Object: Identification, Authen-
tication, Authorization. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.2 Basic ABAC Scenario Hu et al. (2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.3 Blockchain Underlying Bitcoin Nakamoto (2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.4 Timestamp Server Proposed in Bitcoin Nakamoto (2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.5 Proof-Of-Work in Bitcoin Nakamoto (2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.6 Blockchain in General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.1 Access Tree and LSSS Matrix for Boolean Formula A5 ∧ ((A1 ∧ A2) ∨
(A3 ∧ A4)) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
4.1 An Example of Organizational Structure Harris and Maymi (2016). . . . . 36
4.2 System Model of Access Control in Cloud Storage. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
4.3 Data Format on the Cloud Server. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
4.4 Process of Reduction to the M-q-BDHE Problem. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.5 Relations between the Number of Attributes and Time Consumption
for Setup. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4.6 Relations between the Number of Attributes and Time Consumption
for Key Generation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
4.7 Relations between the Number of Attributes and Time Consumption
for Encryption. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
4.8 Relations between the Number of Attributes and Time Consumption
for Decryption. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.9 Relations between the Number of Revoked Identities and Time Con-
sumption in M-DUR-CP-ABE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
xi
Figure Page
5.1 An Example of DC-ABAC Secured IoT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
5.2 An Example of Hospital Organization structure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
5.3 DC-ABAC System and Models. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
5.4 Flowchart of Federated Setup and Key Generation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
5.5 Flowchart of Key Generation Delegation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
5.6 Flowchart of Identity Revocable Access Control. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
5.7 An Example of the Organization Structure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
5.8 Federated Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
5.9 Federated KeyGen.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
5.10 Internal Delegation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
5.11 External Delegation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
5.12 Data Encryption. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
5.13 Data Decryption. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
6.1 System Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
6.2 Share of Parameters in the Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
6.3 Attribute Authority Setup. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
6.4 Key Generation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
6.5 Data Encryption. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
6.6 Data Decryption. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
7.1 System Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
7.2 Transaction Workflow1: Proposal and Packaging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
7.3 Transaction Workflow2: Validation and Updating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
7.4 Trust Framework in Hyperledger Fabric . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
7.5 An Example Enrollment Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
xii
Figure Page
7.6 Attribute-Based Access Control in Hyperledger Fabric . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
7.7 Workflow of the Demo System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
7.8 Example File Encryption Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
7.9 Example File Encryption ABE Ciphertext (Some Information Hidden
for Space Limitation). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
7.10 Upload the ABE Protected Sensitive Message to Blockchain . . . . . . . . . . . 122
xiii
Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
The traditional way to perform access control over data accessible or shared by mul-
tiple entities is to build two separate services or systems, one for data storage and
the other for data access control. Both are out of data owners’ control. This type of
access control system suffers from the problem of separation of data ownership and
management. In particular, it is the data access control system enforcing the access
permission over the data, while not the data owners themselves.
However, in some application scenarios, such as cloud computing and blockchain-
based application, data owners could not trust the data storage providers. In cloud
computing, the storage provider could have access to the stored data at any time.
For the blockchain-based applications, if the sensitive data is included in transactions
which are appended to the chain, any user in the system who is allowed to invoke the
query method would have access to the data. Considering cloud computing platforms
are being used by more and more companies and individuals 1 and the increasing
number of corporations that are investing resources in optimizing their businesses by
taking use of the decentralization and transparency features offered by blockchain 2,
it is of great significance to provide a fine-grained access control mechanism which
enables data owners to perform fine-grained access control in a discretionary way.
Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) [5], in particular Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-
Based Encryption (CP-ABE) [6] is the way to solve all above-mentioned problems.
In particular, it is a cryptographic way to implement the Attribute-Based Access
1https://tinyurl.com/y5rtefd2
2https://tinyurl.com/y6ns865p
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Control (ABAC) model. Different from traditional ways to perform access control,
the data ownership and management are combined together. It is the data owners
themselves to define the access control policy on the data and the access control is
enforced on the data directly by the way of encrypting the data with a specified access
control policy, while not by a separate access control system. In the cloud computing
application scenario, the data storage provider is only responsible for storing the data
but not performing the access control. Even if the data is stored on the public cloud
storage and accessible by everyone, they are still secure because of the encryption.
As promising as it is, multiple users might share common attributes, thus making
the following user and attribute management problems very difficult in practical ap-
plications. In this thesis, I propose new schemes which solve the user and attribute
management problems. Furthermore, existing work focuses more on how to utilize
ABE in cloud storage, while for the most recently proposed blockchain platforms,
such as Hyperledger Fabric, it is still not clear how to integrate ABE to provide dis-
cretionary fine-grained access control by data owners themselves over sensitive data.
1.1 Problem Statement
In the thesis, I study the problem of constructing ABE schemes that provide
features that are of great importance in practical applications and also investigate
how to use ABE schemes in blockchain platforms to provide discretionary fine-grained
access control over sensitive data stored on the chain. In summary, the following
questions are investigated:
• How can a data owner revoke data users in a discretionary way?
• How to assign private attribute key for attributes with temporal constrains?
• How to set up an ABE-enabled trust framework in Hyperledger Fabric?
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In the following, I describe the motivation of each research question. To this end,
at first I give an easy-to-understand explanation of CP-ABE schemes as shown in
Figure 1.1.
Figure 1.1: CP-ABE Example
• Step 1. 1.a: User A is assigned a private key based its attributes, i.e., “ASU”,
“IT dept.”. 1.b: User B is assigned a private key based on its attributes, i.e.,
“ASU”, “Faculty”. 1.c: User C is assigned a private key based on its attributes,
i.e., “ASU”, “Faculty”.
• Step 2. Data is encrypted by the data owner under an access policy over a
certain set of attributes, e.g., “ASU” AND (“Student” OR “Faculty”).
• Step 3. 3.a: User A with attributes “ASU”, “IT dept.” fails to decrypt the
ciphertext since its attributes do not satisfy the access policy. 3.b: User B
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with attributes “ASU”, “Faculty” succeeds to decrypt the ciphertext since its
attributes satisfy the access policy. 3.c: User C succeeds in decryption in the
same way as User B.
Identity Based Discretionary User Revocation
As shown in Figure 1.1, only using the existing attributes “ASU”, “IT Dept.”,
“Student” and “Faculty”, it is impossible to construct the group of authorized users
{User B}. To deal with this issue, when constructing the access policy, user revocation
is needed.
Previous researches define the revocation problem as attribute-based revocation
[1]-[3]. The basic idea is to cease certain access privileges of users from the perspective
of key generation. In particular, whenever a revocation occurs, the trusted authority
generates some secret information for non-revoked users to update their private key.
Since the revoked user does not have the secret updating information, the components
of his/her private key corresponding to the revoked attributes will not work any more,
thus achieving the goal of ceasing certain users’ access privilege(s).
Although attribute-based revocation is a feasible solution to the user revocation
problem in CP-ABE, it suffers the following deficiencies when applied in practice.
First, the trusted authority (TA) has to be online all the time to deal with each
revocation, which becomes a potential single point of failure. Second, each revoca-
tion incurs a key re-distribution procedure, which increases both the computation
overheads and the communication overheads. The overheads will be especially big in
the following three scenarios: the revoked users have a great number of attributes;
the number of the non-revoked users sharing common attributes with the revoked
user is big; user revocation happens frequently. Third, if a user is revoked with the
attribute-based approach, that means he/she is a revoked user for all the data owners.
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Therefore, attribute-based user revocation is suitable for revoking a compromised key.
Whereas, in practice, data user revocation might be brought by other reasons, e.g.,
conflicts of interests. Lastly, the attribute-based revocation is a stateful mechanism
where once a receiver misses an update it will not be able to decrypt future messages
(or this must be corrected somehow). Therefore, it is of great significance to provide
a flexible user revocation scheme for the ABE-enabled access control system.
Automatic Attribute Expiration
As shown in Figure 1.1, there is an implicit assumption that all attributes assigned
to users will not expire. In practice, users’ attributes might only be effective for a
limited time period. However existing CP-ABE schemes lack this important feature
of attribute expiration. One feasible solution is to enforce this feature at the protocol
level by rekeying periodically. Another way to implement attribute expiration is by
leveraging attribute revocation [7, 8]. However, revocation itself is highly inefficient,
usually requires rekeying of all other users, or non-monotonic access policies with
negative attributes [9]. A time-based approach for attribute expiration is presented
in BSW [10]. In this approach, the authority simply appends an expiration date to
the attribute string.
Although the above-mentioned approaches could solve the problem. The most
desirable feature of attribute expiration is that no interaction exists between users
and the trusted authority when an attribute expires. Therefore, in [10], the author
proposed an open problem to construct an automatic attribute expiration CP-ABE
scheme. In particular, the expiration of the attribute should be embedded into the
private attribute key. When decrypting, the checking of whether an attribute expires
or not will be done within the crypto algorithm automatically.
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Discretionary ABAC in Blockchain Applications
Data of applications built upon blockchain will be stored on the peer nodes in the
blockchain network and any user who is permitted to query the data on the chain
would have access privileges as well. In the most popular blockchain application,
Bitcoin, all the transactions within the system are stored on all the nodes and everyone
has access to the data. Considering this would pose data privacy issues, the industry
proposed permissioned blockchain platforms, one of the most popular platforms is
Hyperledger Fabric 3, which restricts access to the blockchain network to only pre-
verified users. In particular, every member or user will be assigned an identity which
is actually a public/private key pair as well as a certificate which binds the public
key with the userID. However, with a single user identity, it is hard to implement
fine-grained access control, especially when the chaincode authors did not know the
identity of the users of the application in advance. To deal with this issue, attribute-
based access control 4 is introduced into the chaincode logics. When registering a
user into the system, the administrator would also assign a set of attributes to the
user. With this mechanism, now the chaincode could do a more fine-grained access
control, for example, only users with a particular attribute(s) could query a certain
set of resources. However, this solution does not solve the issue of separation of data
ownership and data management. It’s the chaincode writer defining the access control
policy but not the asset owners. To this end, in this thesis, I propose a new framework
which combines the attribute-based access control model in Hyperldeger fabric and
the attribute-based encryption to achieve discretionary attribute-based access control
in Hyperledger Fabric.
3https://www.hyperledger.org/projects/fabric
4https://tinyurl.com/y6a5uyju
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1.2 Contributions
To answer the research questions above, the contributions of the thesis are sum-
marized as follows.
• I propose firstly a data owner discretionary CP-ABE user revocation mecha-
nism. During data sharing, the owners are able to revoke any user directly
without turning to TA or re-distributing private keys. I propose a new primi-
tive DUR-CP-ABE that supports both revocation of particular users and affili-
ated users revocation in a batch. I present a construction of the DUR-CP-ABE
scheme and prove that the construction is secure in terms of the proposed se-
curity model. I perform performance evaluation and show that the proposed
DUR-CP-ABE construction is practical for real-world applications.
• I extend the identity revocable CP-ABE scheme to support federation, delega-
tion and inter-operability in system setup and private key generation. Through
federation, no single trusted authority owns the master secret key, while it is
multiple trusted authorities working in a federated way to generate the public
parameter and root organization’s private attribute key, thus splitting the mas-
ter secret key into shares owned by all of them. Federation solves the problem
of single point of failure and single point of trust issue. Delegating TA’s key
generation capability can not only relieve the single-point failure issue, but also
naturally follow the organization’s hierarchical management structure. In prac-
tice, users need to interact with several different organizations that may not
trust each other; a user also may own attributes belonged to different subdi-
visions of an organization. Inter-operability enables a user to get private keys
from different organizations or subdivisions.
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• I propose firstly an ABE scheme supporting automatic attribute expiration
with the following salient features: Decentralization: in the proposed access
control system, the data owner is able to share data based on an access control
policy written over attributes issued across multiple authorities in different or-
ganizations with different roots of trust. Automatic Attribute Expiration: the
proposed scheme assigns a time period of validity for each attribute during the
key generation phase. When the data owner encrypts data, a current time is
attached to each attribute in the access policy tree. In this way, the data owner
could make a more fine-grained access control on the time dimension. Only
users whose attributes are still valid when the data is encrypted and shared
could decrypt the ciphertext.
• I propose an ABE-enabled trust framework for the popular blockchain platform
Hyperledger Fabric. I implement the trust framework by providing lightweight
attribute authorities which provide proof of users’ attributes by taking use
of the bilinear short signature Boneh et al. (2001) which is much more effi-
cient compared with the traditional signature schemes, such as RSA, DSA,
ECDSA, etc.. I implement an ABE toolkit for private key distribution and
data encryption/decryption. I implement a file encryption/decryption toolkit
to work together with ABE scheme so that data of any format could be en-
crypted/decrypted. I also provided a Hyperledger Fabric example application
to show how ABE could be used to provide discretionary, fine-grained attribute-
based access control over the sensitive data stored in the blockchain system.
1.3 Thesis Organization
Rest of the thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, I describe related work of
this thesis. In Chapter 3, I provide mathematical preliminaries used in this thesis. In
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Chapter 4, I present an ABE scheme which supports hierarchical identity-based user
revocation. In Chapter 5, I present an ABE scheme which extends the scheme Chapter
4 to support federation, delegation and inter-operability. In Chapter 6, I describe an
ABE scheme which supports automatic attribute expiration. In Chapter 7, I describe
how to enable discretionary attribute-based access control with ABE in Hyperledger
Fabric applications. Chapter 8 concludes the thesis and describes future work.
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Chapter 2
RELATED WORK
In this chapter, I will introduce some background knowledge of this thesis, includ-
ing the attribute-based access control model, the history of ABE and its extension
and an introduction of the blockchain technology.
2.1 Access Control
2.1.1 Definition
Access Control is defined as Harris and Maymi (2016) security features which
control the way users and systems communicate and interact with other systems and
resources. The purpose is to protect systems and resources from unauthorized access.
The following are some important terms I will use when talking about access control
Harris and Maymi (2016).
• Access: it is the flow of information between a subject and an object.
• Subject: it is an active entity that requests access to an object or the data
within an object. It could be a user, a program or a process, etc.
• Object: it is a passive entity that contains information or needed functionality.
It could be a database, a file, a column in a database’s table, etc.
Take the cloud storage as the example: a user who requests to access the files
stored in the cloud storage server is a subject, and the files are the objects. The flow
of request and response information between the user and the files is access.
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2.1.2 Access Control Model
An access control model is a framework defining how subjects access objects.
Currently there are mainly three different types of access control models, i.e., dis-
cretionary, mandatory, and role-based access control. In the following, I will briefly
introduce each type of these access control models Harris and Maymi (2016).
• Discretionary Access Control (DAC): this access control model enables
the owner of the object to specify which subjects can access this object. The
term “discretionary” means the control of the access is on the basis of the
object’s owner’s discretion. Access Control List (ACL) is the most common
implementation of the DAC model. Most of the popular operating systems are
based on DAC models. In the properties of a file, choices that allow users to
control by whom, to what degree this file could be accessed could be found.
DAC is based on identities of users. The identities could be user identity or
group membership identity.
• Mandatory Access Control (MAC): the MAC model is more strict and
structured than the DAC model. It is built on basis of a security label system.
Data are classified by security clearance (e.g., secret, top secret, confidential,
etc.) and users are classified in the same way. For a user’s access request, it is
the user’s security clearance, the object’s classification and the system’s security
policy all together making the decision. MAC-based systems are usually used
by government organizations for maintaining confidential information.
• Role-Based Access Control (RBAC): By the DAC model, the access control
is specified at the object level by the way of ACLs. The ACL administrator
who is permitted to create and edit the ACL is responsible for translating
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an organizational authorization policy into permission. With the increasing
number of objects and subjects, some subjects will be granted unnecessary
access to some objects. These unnecessary permissions violate the least-privilege
rule and increase data leakage risks. Different from DAC where access is based
on user identity, the RBAC model is based on role which is defined in terms
of the operations and tasks the role is going to carry out. With RBAC, the
permissions are assigned in an implicit way, i.e., they are assigned to a role or
group but not directly to a user, and the user just inherits those attributes.
2.2 Attribute-Based Access Control
2.2.1 Motivation
The following is a brief review of some concepts in access control Harris and Maymi
(2016) below.
• Identification: subjects supplying identification information, e.g., username,
userID, account number, etc..
• Authentication: verifying the identification information with information such
as password, PIN value, fingerprint, etc..
• Authorization (Access Control): using the identity of the subject together
with other criteria to make a determination of operations that a subject can
carry out on objects, i.e., “I know who you are, now what am I going to allow
you to do?”
The traditional access control models described above are based on a user’s iden-
tity in the following steps as presented in Figure 2.1, either directly or by the way
of predefined attribute types, e.g., roles/groups, assigned to the identity Hu et al.
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Identification Authentication Authorization
Figure 2.1: Three Steps for a Subject to Access an Object: Identification, Authenti-
cation, Authorization.
(2015). However, this type of access control models suffer from the following issues
Hu et al. (2015).
• Inter-organization authorization issue: in non-ABAC inter-organizational
access requests, e.g., user userA from organization A would request to access
organizationB’s resources, the user has to get its identity pre-provisioned in
organizationB and added to the requested’ object’s ACL before the access could
be performed successfully.
• Expressiveness issue: the identity, roles or groups are not sufficient for ex-
pressing the access control needs in real-world applications. Take RBAC as the
example, its role assignments are usually based on static organizational posi-
tions, thus presenting challenges for applications where dynamic access control
decisions are required. Although with ad-hoc roles, dynamic access control
could be implemented, it will lead to the issue of “role explosion”.
The biggest issue of the traditional access control models is that previous knowl-
edge of object by the subject or knowledge of the subject by the object owner must
be provided Hu et al. (2013). To this end, an alternative approach to grant or deny
user access requests on the basis of the user’s attributes, object’s attributes and en-
vironmental conditions were proposed. This type of access control model is named
Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC) Hu et al. (2013).
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2.2.2 Definition
Definition 2.1. Attribute Based Access Control (ABAC): An access control
method where subject requests to perform operations on objects are granted or denied
based on assigned attributes of the subject, assigned attributes of the object, environ-
ment conditions, and a set of policies that are specified in terms of those attributes
and conditions.
Besides the terms explained in section 2.1, in the following, terms attribute, oper-
ation, environment condition and policy are explained Hu et al. (2013).
• Attributes: characteristics of the subject, object, or environment conditions.
Usually it is denoted by a key-value pair.
• Operation: executions of a function at the request of a subject upon an object.
Common operations include “read”, “write”, “execute”, “edit”, etc..
• Environment Condition: it is defined as detectable environmental charac-
teristics. It is independent of both subject and object. It may include time,
location, etc..
• Policy: the representation of rules or relationships which enables to determine
whether an access request should be permitted, given the values of the subject’s
attributes, object’s attributes, and possibly environment conditions.
As described in Figure 2.2, step 1 shows the process of a subject sending ac-
cess request to an object; step 2a, 2b, 2c, 2d shows that the ABAC access control
mechanism evaluates a) policy, b) subject attributes, c) object attributes and d) envi-
ronment conditions, to make a decision; step 3 shows that the subject is given access
to the object if permitted.
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Figure 2.2: Basic ABAC Scenario Hu et al. (2013)
2.2.3 Benefits
In summary, the ABAC model provides the following benefits compared with the
traditional access control models Hu et al. (2015).
• since the access control decision is made based on a higher number of inputs
(subject attributes, object attributes, environment conditions, and policy), a
larger set of possible combinations could be used to get a larger number of and
more expressive policies.
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• the access decisions vary between different requests simply based on different
attribute values, while not change the policy itself.
• there is no need to get prior knowledge of the relationship between the subject
and object. When there are members joining or leaving the system, it is not
necessary to modify the policies.
2.3 Attribute-Based Encryption
2.3.1 Motivation
The development of Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) is similar to how the
ABAC model was proposed. The goal is to share encrypted data among multiple
users so that only authorized users could decrypt the ciphertexts. Since ABE is
a public key encryption scheme, in the following I review the development history
starting from public key encryption.
Traditional Public Key Encryption
In public key encryption schemes, each user has a randomly generated public/private
key pair. The private key is kept secret by the user and the public key is published
to the public. Whenever user B sends a message to user A, he will at first get user
A’s public key pkA and then encrypt the message with the encryption algorithm with
inputs of the message and pkA. Only user A who has the private key skA could decrypt
the ciphertext. However, if a malicious user C cheated B into using her public key
pkC to encrypt the message, then C is capable to decrypt the ciphertext while B still
thought he sent the message to A. Therefore, it is very important to get users’ public
keys in a trustworthy way. To deal with this issue, Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
was proposed. Each user will publish its public key with a certificate which includes
16
both the user’s identity and its public key. This could be considered as a trustworthy
map from a user’s identity to its public key. It is computationally impossible for the
malicious user C to create a certificate which maps user B’s identity to pkC .
PKI management overhead is very big. It would be better if there is a natural
binding between a user’s identity and its public key. To this end, Shamir (1984)
proposed identity-based cryptosystems and signature schemes.
Identity-Based Encryption
The Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) is a special type of public key encryption with
an extra twist. In IBE, the public key is not randomly generated, it could be a string
that uniquely identifies this user. For example, it could be an email address, a social
security number, telephone number, etc., or their combinations.
For the use case described in the section “Traditional Public Key Encryption”,
when user B wants to send secret message to user A, there is no need to get the
pkA anymore, while he could just encrypt the message with user A’s identity IDA,
for example, user A’s email. Only user A whose identity is verified to be IDA could
decrypt the ciphertext. The malicious user C could not make the fake binding of IDA
and pkC anymore since in the IBE cryptosystem, (IDA = pkA) 6= (IDC = pkC).
The IBE cryptosystem was firstly proposed in the year of 1994, while the first
scheme was constructed in 2001 in Boneh and Franklin (2001).
Fuzzy Identity-Based Encryption
Since the first construction of IBE scheme in Boneh and Franklin (2001), there
are more constructions based on different mathematical assumptions Waters (2005);
Cocks (2001); Boneh and Boyen (2004). All these schemes have a common feature
that identities are viewed as a string of characters.
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Considering biometric identities which inherently include some noises in each sam-
ple, Sahai and Waters (2005) proposed fuzzy identity-based encryption which provides
error-tolerance property. In fuzzy IBE, an identity is viewed as a set of descriptive
attributes. For example, to encrypt a message M with an identity ID, the ciphertext
is C = ENC(M, ID). A user with identity ID′ is capable to decrypt the ciphertext
C if and only if ID and ID′ are close to each other. The distance is measured by the
“set overlap” distance metric. It is in Sahai and Waters (2005) where the concept
“attribute-based encryption” was proposed. However in this paper, “attribute-based
encryption” was just defined as a type of application where the data owner wishes to
encrypt a file to all data users who were assigned a certain set of attributes.
In an “attribute-based encryption” system, both ciphertexts and users’ keys are
labeled with a set of attributes. A user could decrypt the ciphertext only if there is a
match between the user’s and the ciphertext’s attributes. The decryption of the fuzzy
IBE based ABE succeeds only when at least a pre-defined threshold, say k, attributes
overlapped. Although this is enough for the biometrics identity applications, this
type of ABE lacks expressibility, thus limiting its applications in other larger system
Goyal et al. (2006). To this end, Goyal et al. proposed a new crypto-system, which
used the same name, “Attribute-Based Encryption”.
2.3.2 Definition
Based on where the access policy is enforced, ABE schemes could be classified into
two types, i.e., Key-Policy ABE (KP-ABE) where access policy is defined on user’s
private keys, and Ciphertext-Policy ABE (CP-ABE) where access policy is defined
on the ciphertext. In the following, I describe both scheme’s algorithm syntax.
18
Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption
According to the definition in Goyal et al. (2006), KP-ABE scheme consists of the
following algorithms.
• Setup This is a randomized algorithm that takes no input other than the
implicit security parameter. It outputs the public parameters PK and a master
key MK.
• Encryption This is a randomized algorithm that takes as inputs a message m,
a set of attributes γ, and the public parameters PK. It outputs the ciphertext
E.
• Key Generation This is a randomized algorithm that takes as inputs an access
structure A, the master key MK and the public parameters PK. It outputs a
decryption key D.
• Decryption This algorithm takes as input the ciphertext E that was encrypted
under the set of attributes S, the decryption key D for access control structure
A and the public parameters PK. It outputs the message M if S satisfies A.
Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption
According to the definition in Bethencourt et al. (2007a), CP-ABE scheme consists
of the following algorithms.
• Setup The setup algorithm takes no input other than the implicit security
parameter. It outputs the public parameters PK and a master key MK.
• Encryption The encryption algorithm takes as input the public parameters
PK, a message M , and an access structure A over the universe of attributes.
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The algorithm will encrypt M and produce a ciphertext CT such that only a
user who possesses a set of attributes that satisfies the access structure will
be able to decrypt the message. I will assume that the ciphertext implicitly
contains A.
• Key Generation The key generation algorithm takes as inputs the master key
MK and a set of attributes S that describe the key. It outputs a private key
SK.
• Decrypt The decryption algorithm takes as inputs the public parameters PK,
a ciphertext CT , which contains an access policy A, and a private key SK, which
is a private key for a set of attributes S. If the set of attributes S satisfies the
access structure A then the algorithm will decrypt the ciphertext and return a
message M .
2.3.3 Benefits
• Discretionary access control: Compared with the traditional monitoring-based
access control system, ABE provides a way for users to perform access control
over their data in a discretionary way.
• Access control goes together with data: the data themselves contain access
control. No matter where the data is copied or leaked, they are in an encrypted
format and only authorized users could decrypt the data.
• Fine-grained access control: ABE is a type of attribute-based access control
model, thus being expressive and flexible.
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2.4 Blockchain
2.4.1 Bitcoin
Motivation
Traditional e-commerce relies on a trusted third party, e.g., financial institutions,
to deal with electronic payments. This suffers the following drawbacks Nakamoto
(2008):
• mediation costs such as transaction costs. This limits the minimum practical
transaction size and also cuts off possible small casual transactions.
• collecting unnecessary customer information, thus leading to privacy issues.
• unavoidable frauds.
To this end, an anonymous individual or organization named Nakamoto Satoshi
proposed a peer-to-peer electronic cash system, named Bitcoin Nakamoto (2008). It
allows online payment sent from one party to another directly without relying on a
third trusted financial institution.
Blockchain Underlying Bitcoin
As shown in Figure 2.3, an electronic coin is a chain of digital signatures. Each owner
in the system has a public/private key pair. A coin is transferred to the next owner
by creating a digital signature with inputs of a hash of the previous transaction and
the next owner’s public key, and then append these to the coin. A payee verifies the
coin ownership by verifying these signatures.
The chain above could not prevent a payer from double-spending, i.e., send the
money to two different payees by creating two signatures one for each payee’s public
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Figure 2.3: Blockchain Underlying Bitcoin Nakamoto (2008)
key. To prevent this double-spending problem, timestamp server was introduced.
The timestamp server takes a hash of block of times to be timestamped (as shown in
Figure 2.4) and then publishes the hash.
Figure 2.4: Timestamp Server Proposed in Bitcoin Nakamoto (2008)
To implement a peer-to-peer timestamp server so that the temporal sequence of
the block is consistent system-wide, Bitcoin proposed a consensus protocol named
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Proof-Of-Work (POW). It involves finding a value in a brute-force way, so that when
hashed, the hash value begins with a pre-defined number of zero bits. In Bitcoin,
as shown in Figure 2.5 it is implemented by increasing a nonce until it gives the
block’s hash value the required number of zero bits. If the malicious payee wants to
double-spend a coin, it has to re-do the proof of work, i.e. for the block involving
the modified transaction as well as all the following blocks, also it has to catch up
with the work of the other benign nodes. The longest chain in the system represents
the system consensus. It is essentially one-CPU-one-vote. Therefore, if the majority
of the computation power in the system is controlled by the honest nodes, then the
malicious party will fail in creating a longer chain.
Figure 2.5: Proof-Of-Work in Bitcoin Nakamoto (2008)
The following summarizes the workflow of the Bitcoin network Nakamoto (2008).
• New transactions are broadcast to all nodes.
• Each node collects new transactions into a block.
• Each node works on finding a difficult proof-of-work for its block.
• When a node finds a proof-of-work, it broadcasts the block to all nodes.
• Nodes accept the block only if all transactions in it are valid and not already
spent.
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• Nodes express their acceptance of the block by working on creating the next
block in the chain, using the hash of the accepted block as the previous hash.
2.4.2 The Blockchain Technology
Figure 2.6: Blockchain in General
As shown in Figure 2.6, blockchain is considered to be a distributed and immutable
transaction ledger. It is replicated across a distributed network of peer nodes each
of whom collaborate in its maintenance. The blockcahin transactions are run by the
nodes when they have been validated by a consensus protocol. These transactions will
be grouped into blocks, which include a hash value that cryptographically links each
block to the preceding block, thus forming a chain of blocks where the terminology
Blockchain comes from Semiconductors (2019).
2.4.3 Blockchain Classification
Blockchain can be broadly classified as permissionless blockchains e.g., Bitcoin
Nakamoto (2008), Etherum Wood (2014), etc., and permissioned blockchains e.g.,
Hyperledger Semiconductors (2019). With permissionless blockchain solutions, trans-
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actions are executed on all the nodes in the network. Therefore, both source codes,
(i.e., smart contracts or chaincode) and transaction data are revealed in public, thus
it has significant concerns on privacy and confidentiality for smart contracts. For
instance, in a distributed supply-chain application Semiconductors (2019), a supplier
does not want to reveal business data for a specific business partner (e.g., pricing
quote, product information) to other irrelevant business partners.
Permission based blockchain solutions such as Hyperledger are designed to ad-
dress the data/transaction privacy issues by creating a trusted permission group. It
operates a distributed ledger among a set of identified participants under a gover-
nance model, thus eliminating the complicated consensus model, e.g., PoW Gervais
et al. (2016). Furthermore, identifiers allow the end-user of the system to control to
which degree it interacts and shares information with the other parties inside and
outside the system. In Hyperledger, a ledger corresponds to a channel. The ledger
can only be shared by the members on the channel. In this way, unauthorized users
and network nodes will be excluded from the blockchain network.
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Chapter 3
ABE PRELIMINARIES
In this chapter, I will introduce some preliminaries of attribute-based encryption
schemes.
3.1 Mathematical Background
3.1.1 Group and Cyclic Group
In mathematical context, a group G is a set of elements equipped with a binary
operator × that are related with each other according to the following four well-
defined conditions called group axioms.
• Closure: for any two elements x and y, x× y is in the group G as well.
• Associativity: for any three elements x, y and z, (x× y)× z = x× (y × z).
• Identity element: there exists an element e ∈ G such that for every element
x ∈ G, x× e = e× x = x. The identity element e is denoted by 1.
• Inverse element: for each element x ∈ G, there exists an element y such that
x× y = y × x = e, where e is the identity element. y is the inverse element of
x, and is denoted by x−1.
A group is called cyclic if there exists at least one element g ∈ G such that all
the elements in the group are powers of it. When using multiplication as the group
binary operator shown as above, the elements of the group can be denoted by
· · · , g−3, g−2, g−1, g0 = e, g, g2, g3, · · ·
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3.1.2 Prime Order Bilinear Pairing
Prime order pairing is a bilinear map function e : G1 × G2 → GT , where G1, G2
and GT are three cyclic groups with large prime order p. The G1 and G2 are additive
group and GT is multiplicative group .The discrete logarithm problem on G1, G2 and
GT are hard. Pairing has the following properties:
• Bilinearity :
e(ga, hb) = e(g, h)ab, ∀g ∈ G1, h ∈ G2, a, b ∈ Z∗p.
• Nondegeneracy :
e(g0, h0) 6= 1 where g0 is the generator of G1 and h0 is the generator of G2.
• Computability :
There exists an efficient algorithm to compute the pairing.
3.1.3 Composite Order Bilinear Pairing
There are multiple types of composite order bilinear pairing. In the following, I
present one used in this thesis.
A three-prime composite pairing Lewko and Waters (2011): the three-prime com-
posite pairing is a bilinear map function e : G2 → GT where G and GT are cyclic
groups of order N = p1p2p3 and p1, p2 and p3 are distinct primes. The map function
satisfieS the following conditions:
• Bilinear: ∀g, h ∈ G, a, b ∈ ZN , e(ga, hb) = e(g, h)ab.
• Nondegerate: ∃g ∈ G such that e(g, g) has order n in GT .
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Assume that the group operations in G and GT as well as the bilinear map e are
computable in polynomial time. Gp1 ,Gp2 and Gp3 denotes the subgroups of order
p1, p2 and p3 in G respectively. Suppose hi ∈ Gpi and hj ∈ Gpj for i 6= j.
• Orthogonality: e(hi, hj) is the identity element of GT .
3.2 Access Structure
3.2.1 Definition
Definition 3.1. Access Structure Goyal et al. (2006). Let {P1, P2, . . . , Pn} be a
set of parties. A collection A ⊆ 2{P1,P2,...,Pn} is monotone if ∀B,C: if B ∈ A and
B ⊆ C then C ∈ A. An access structure is a collection A of non-empty subsets of
{P1, P2, . . . , Pn}, i.e.,A ⊆ 2{P1,P2,...,Pn}\{∅}. The sets in A are defined as authorized
sets, and sets that do not belong to A are defined as unauthorized sets.
3.2.2 Linear Secret Sharing Scheme
LSSS matrices can be utilized to express any monotonic access structure, which are
the most commonly used access structures in most CP-ABE schemes. The algorithm
of constructing an LSSS matrix is proposed by Lewko and Waters. Linear Secret
Sharing Scheme, a.k.a., LSSS is defined as follows.
Definition 3.2. Linear Secret Sharing Schemes(LSSS) Lewko and Waters (2011).
A secret sharing scheme Π over a set of parties is called linear over Zp if the following
two conditions are satisfied
• the shares for each party form a vector over Zp;
• a share-generating matrix for Π has ` rows and n columns. For all i = 1, . . . , `,
the ith row of M , I define ρ(i) as the party labeling row i. For the column vector
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v = (s, r2, r3, . . . , rn) where s ∈ Zp is the shared secret and r2, r3, . . . , rn ∈ Z
are randomly chosen numbers, then Mv is the vector of ` shares of the secret s
according to Π, where the share (Mv)i belongs to party ρ(i).
As shown in Beimel (1996), every linear secret sharing-scheme according to the
above definition also enjoys the following linear reconstruction property:
Assume that Π is an LSSS for the access structure A. Define S ∈ A as an
authorized set and I ⊂ [1, l] as I = {i : ρ(i) ∈ S}. Then, constants {wi ∈ Zp}i∈I
can be derived in polynomial time such that for valid shares {λi} of any secret s,∑
i∈Iwiλi = s.
3.2.3 Conversion Algorithm
A monotonic access structure could be expressed by an access tree with “AND”,
“OR” gates as interior nodes and attributes as leaf nodes. Lewko and Waters’ con-
version algorithm works as follows.
3.2.4 Access Structure Example
Here, I show an example of how to convert a boolean formula to an access tree,
and from an access tree to an access structure that is expressed by an LSSS matrix.
Denote the attribute by A1, A2, A3, A4 and A5. The example boolean formula is
as follows
A5 ∧ ((A1 ∧ A2) ∨ (A3 ∧ A4))
. The access tree with “AND” and “OR” gate is presented as in Figure 3.1. Each
subset of the rows of matrix M includes (1, 0, 0) in its span if and only if the corre-
sponding attributes satisfy the boolean formula A5 ∧ ((A1 ∧ A2) ∨ (A3 ∧ A4)).
If a user has attributes A1, A2 and A5, then the corresponding row of the matrix
will be (1, 1, 0), (0,−1, 1) and (0, 0,−1). If these three vectors are added together,
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Algorithm 3.1 The Lewko-Waters Algorithm
Input: An Access Tree T , c = 1
Output: The Corresponding LSSS Matrix
1: for each level of the tree T
2: for each node N in T
3: if the parent node is an OR gate labeled by the vector v
4: then
5: Label the left child of N by vector ← v
6: Label the right child of N by vector ← v
7: else
8: Pad N’s vector with 0 at the end (if necessary) to make it of length c
9: Label the left child by vector ← v‖1
10: Label the right child by vector ← (0, · · · , 0)‖− 1 where (0, · · · , 0) denotes
the vector 0 of length c
11: c← c+ 1
12: endif
13: end loop
14: end loop
(1, 0, 0) could be obtained. This is the most important features used to construct an
attribute-based encryption scheme, i.e., only authorized user could recover (1, 0, 0).
If a random vector v = (s, r1, r2) is created and M is changed to be M = Mv, then
the recovered vector would be (s, 0, 0). The value s is used in the encryption scheme
to hide the message.
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OR
M=
1, 1, 0
0,-1, 1
0, 0,-1
𝜌 1 = 𝐴5
𝜌 2 = 𝐴1
𝜌 5 = 𝐴4
AND
A5
(0,-1), c=2
AND
A3 A4
AND
A1 A2
(0,-1,1)
c=2
(0,0,-1)
c=2
(0,-1,1)
c=2
(0,-1), c=2
(0,-1), c=2(1,1), c=2
(1), c=1
(0,0,-1)
c=2
0,-1, 1
0, 0,-1
𝜌 3 = 𝐴2
𝜌 4 = 𝐴3
Figure 3.1: Access Tree and LSSS Matrix for Boolean Formula A5∧((A1∧A2)∨(A3∧
A4))
31
Chapter 4
USER REVOCATION IN ABE
This chapter focuses on the problem of user revocation in ABE. I will introduce
the background of this problem, propose a new ABE scheme which supports user
revocation, and describe a construction and perform performance evaluation.
4.1 Background
4.1.1 Motivation
Because of its superior flexibility, accessibility, and capacity compared to tra-
ditional computing and storage methods, cloud computing is quickly becoming a
mainstay for many companies today. Storage services over cloud, e.g., Microsoft’s
Azure storage, Amazon’s S3 and Google Cloud, are a fundamental component of
cloud computing, which allows consumers to outsource their data to remote cloud
servers. Storing data in the cloud relieves consumers from the burden of maintain-
ing their data, which is usually extremely costly. However, service consumers and
providers are not in the same trust domain, therefore the consumers would worry
about their data privacy. Both malicious insiders, such as administrators, and out-
side attackers, such as hackers with root rights, may have full access to the server
and consequently to consumers’ data. Frequent cloud data leakage accidents in the
recent years have raised both service consumer and provider concerns regarding the
privacy of cloud-stored data and pushed the development of using cryptography to
support access control on the cloud.
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Ciphertext Policy Attribute-Based Encryption Bethencourt et al. (2007b) is re-
garded as one of the most expressive technologies and is a natural fit for attribute-
based access control in cloud storage. In CP-ABE, each user is entitled a set of
attributes, which are embedded into the private key by the trusted authority (TA)
that is responsible for system setup and key generation/distribution. A data owner
enforces an access policy over the shared data directly by encrypting the data with
the access structure extracted from the access policy. Instead of by the server, the
access checking is done “inside the cryptography”, where only data users with eli-
gible attributes (i.e., satisfying the access structure) could decrypt the ciphertext.
Different from identity-based and role-based cryptographic schemes, the public key
and ciphertext size of CP-ABE are not related with the number of data users and no
interactions among data owners and data users are needed. Moreover, CP-ABE is
resistant against collusion attacks from unauthorized users. All these nice properties
make CP-ABE very suitable for implementing fine-grained access control for secure
data sharing in cloud computing where the storage server cannot be fully trusted.
As promising as it is, multiple users might share common attributes, thus making
user management, especially user revocation extremely difficult when applying state-
of-the-art CP-ABE schemes in practice. Previous researches define the revocation
problem as attribute-based revocation Yu et al. (2010); Li et al. (2013); Hur and
Noh (2011); Yang et al. (2013). However this solution suffers from the deficiencies
described in Chapter 1.
4.1.2 Existing Solution
Boldyreva et al. Boldyreva et al. (2008) proposed an identity-based scheme with
efficient user revocation capability. It applies key updates with significantly reduced
computational cost based on a binary tree data structure, which is also applicable
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to KP-ABE and fuzzy IBE user revocation. However, its applicability to CP-ABE
is not clear. Libert et al. Libert and Vergnaud (2009) proposed an identity-based
encryption scheme with stronger adaptive-ID sense to address the selective security
issue of Boldyreva et al. (2008). Lewko et al. Lewko et al. (2010) proposed two novel
broadcast encryption schemes with effective user revocation capability. EASiER Jahid
et al. (2011) architecture is described to support fine-grained access control policies
and dynamic group membership based on attribute-based encryption. It relies on
a proxy to participate in the decryption and enforce revocation, such that the user
can be revoked without re-encrypting ciphertexts or issuing new keys to other users.
Chen et al. Chen et al. (2012) presented an identity-based encryption scheme using
lattices to realize revocation. Li et al. Li et al. (2015) first introduced outsourcing
computation in identity-based encryption and presented a revocable scheme in the
server-aided settings. It achieves constant computation cost at public key generator
and private key size at user end, and the user does not have to contact public key
generator for key update.
To this end, I propose a new scheme named Discretionary User Revocable CP-
ABE, DUR-CP-ABE for short Dong et al. (2018). Different from previous attribute-
based approaches, the proposed scheme supports identity-based revocation. In the
key generation phase, on the one hand attributes are allocated to users as in state-
of-the-art CP-ABE schemes, on the other hand a unique identity (ID) is assigned to
each user. That is, both attributes and the ID are embedded into a user’s private
key. The encryption algorithm works by two steps: first, specify attribute literals in
conjunctive/disjunctive normal forms as an access structure to cover the recipients
of the target group of data users; second, revoke undesired users by incorporating
their identities into the ciphertext. In this way, only users whose attributes satisfy
the access structure and meanwhile are not revoked by the data owners could decrypt
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the ciphertext. In order to revoke users who are affiliated with the same organization
in a batch, I introduce hierarchical identity structure. If an organization is revoked,
then all the affiliated users will be revoked.
4.2 System and Security Model
4.2.1 Identity Format
In a database directory based on the X.500 standard, the following rules Harris
and Maymi (2016) are used for object organizations:
• The directory has a tree structure to organize the entries using a parent-child
configuration.
• Each entry has a unique name made up of attributes of a specific object.
• The attributes used in the directory are dictated by the defined schema.
• The unique identifiers are called distinguished names.
To illustrate how to encode user identities in the proposed scheme based on the
aforementioned database directory, I present an example directory in Figure 4.1 of
a security company. The non-leaf nodes represent organizations, among which the
root node represents the trusted authority. The leaf nodes represent users. Each
organization (and user) has a unique identity under the parent organization, which
is called local identity (LID), and meantime a unique global identity (denoted by ID)
within the whole system. Assume that the hierarchical identity structure tree has
H + 1 layers (the root node is on the 0th layer), then the organizations and users’
identities can be constructed according to the following syntax:
0-ID := ID of the root trusted authority,
i-ID := parent (i− 1)-ID ‖ i-LID, (1 ≤ i ≤ H)
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dc = .com
dc = .LogicalSecurity
dc = .R&D dc = .Sales dc = .Purchasing dc = .Product
dc = .Domestic dc = .International dc = .IDS/IPS dc = .SSL/TLS
dc = .CAN dc = .USA dc = .Overseas
cn = .Shon Harris
dc = .Europe dc = .Asia
Figure 4.1: An Example of Organizational Structure Harris and Maymi (2016).
Take the hierarchical identities of LocalSecurity in Figure. 4.1 as an example.
dc=.LocalSecurity is the trusted authority. There exist several departments under
her administration, such as dc=.R&D, dc=.Sales, etc. An employee cn=.Shon Har-
ris works in a fourth-level department with the hierarchical identity (i.e., distin-
guished name) “dc=.LocalSecurity”‖“dc=.Sales”‖“dc=.International”‖“dc= .USA”
‖“cn=.Shon Harris”. For a user on the ith layer, I also define:
ID|h:= ancestor h-ID,
where h ∈ [1, i−1] and “ancestor h-ID” denotes the identity of the ancestor node
on the hth layer from root node to the user node. For the user Shon Harris,
ID|1 = “dc=.LocalSecurity”‖“dc=.Sales”
ID|2 = “dc=.LocalSecurity”‖“dc=.Sales”‖“dc=.International”
ID|3 = “dc=.LocalSecurity”‖“dc=.Sales”‖“dc=.International”‖“dc=.USA”
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Both the user identity and the ancestors’ identity will be embedded into the user’s
private key. In the hierarchical identity structure tree, users can be on any layer
of the tree (except for the 0th layer). With the proposed identity-based revocation
mechanism and the hierarchical identity structure, on each layer, both individual
users and organizations can be revoked. Furthermore, if an organization is revoked,
then all the affiliated users will be revoked, thus achieving the goal of revocation in a
batch.
4.2.2 System Model
I consider an access control system for cloud storage service as presented in Fig-
ure 4.2. There exist four entities in the system: Data owners, Cloud Server, Trusted
Authority (TA) and Data Consumers (users).
The Data Owner chooses access policies and identities of undesired data users and
encrypts the data under the policies and set of revoked identities before outsourcing
them to the Cloud Server. A hybrid encryption approach will be adopted. The
ABE scheme is used to encrypt a data encrypting key (DEK), and then the data is
encrypted by the DEK with a symmetric encryption scheme. In Figure. 4.2, the DEK
is the symmetric encryption key K. The Data Owner will upload the ABE ciphertext
of K and the symmetric encryption ciphertext of the data M . In application scenarios
where the data size is large, the Data Owner needs to divide the data into several
blocks/components according to the logic granularities and then encrypt each block
with symmetric encryption key(s). Therefore the format of the data stored on the
cloud server might be in either format shown in Figure. 4.3.
The cloud server provides data storage service to data owners and data access
service to users. Instead of by engaging the cloud server in the data access control,
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Cloud Server
Data Owner
Trusted 
Authority
User 1
User 2
…
User N
IAM
Server
Figure 4.2: System Model of Access Control in Cloud Storage.
… …
… …
Figure 4.3: Data Format on the Cloud Server.
with ABE solutions the access checking is done “inside the cryptography”. In this
way, only data users whose attributes satisfy the access policy and are not revoked
can decrypt the ciphertext.
The IAM server stores the organization’s directory and provides directory services
to both the Data Owner and the Trusted Authority. During encryption, the Data
Owner searches the undesired users’ full structural identities. The IAM might also
provide the service of finding whether and how to implement affiliated revocation to
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the Data Owner. Whenever a new user joins the organization, the TA asks for the
information about the user from the IAM server and based on the obtained attributes
and identity information to generate the secret key.
The TA as shown in Figure. 4.2, is the root node in the organizational structure.
She is the root of trust in the whole organization and is responsible for entitling
attributes, identities, and assigning private keys to users when there are entitled
attributes and identities.
The data user is entitled a set of attributes and a unique ID according to his/her
role or identity in the organizational structure. Because of various reasons such
as interests conflicts, the data owners might revoke some of the users even if their
attributes satisfy the access policy. Therefore, the user can decrypt the ciphertext
only when he/she has eligible attributes and is not in the revoked set associated with
the ciphertext.
4.2.3 Framework of Data Access Control Scheme
The framework of hierarchical identity revocable ABE scheme (DUR-CP-ABE) is
defined as follows.
Definition 4.1. (CP-ABE WITH DISCRETIONARY USER REVOCATION). A
DUR-CP-ABE scheme consists of the following algorithms: Setup, KeyGen, Encrypt
and Decrypt where Encrypt is used for enforcing attribute-based access control and
revoking undesired users.
• Setup(λ,U) → (MSK,PP, {PKx}): This algorithm is run by the Trusted
Authority. It takes as inputs the security parameter λ and the attribute universe
U and outputs master secret key MSK, public parameters PP, and the set of
all the public attribute keys {PKx}.
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• KeyGen(MSK, ID,S)→ SK: The private key generation algorithm is run by
the Trusted Authority. It takes as inputs the master secret key MSK, a user’s
hierarchically structured identity ID, and a set of attributes S that describes
the user’s access privilege. It outputs the user’s secret key SK.
• Encrypt(PP, {PKx},M, IDs,A) → CT : The data encryption algorithm is
run by the data owner. It takes as inputs the public parameters PP, the set of
public attribute key {PKx}, a message M , the set IDs of revoked identities. It
outputs a ciphertext CT.
• Decrypt(CT, SK) → M or ⊥: The data decryption algorithm is run by the
user. It takes as inputs the ciphertext CT and the private key SK. CT is
associated with an access policy A and a set of revoked identities denoted by
IDs. It outputs the message M if the attributes of the secret key holder with
identity ID satisfy A and ID /∈ IDs.
Consistency Constraint: Given that SK is the private key generated by KeyGen
when it takes inputs of an identity ID and an attribute set S; CT is the ciphtertext
generated by Encrypt when it takes inputs of a revoked identity set IDs and an ac-
cess structure A. The DUR-CP-ABE scheme should satisfy the following consistency
constraint:
∀M : Decrypt(CT, SK) = M , if ID /∈ IDs and S ∈ A
AND
Decrypt(CT, SK) = ⊥ if ID ∈ IDs or S /∈ A.
In particular, only if a user is not revoked and his/her attribute set S satisfies
the access structure A, can the decryption algorithm work correctly. Here ID /∈ IDs
means the user’s ID is not in the revoked identity set and meanwhile the user is
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not under the administration of the organization(s) whose ID is included in the re-
voked identity set. Take the organizational structure in Figure. 4.1 as an example, if
“dc=.LocalSecurity”‖“dc=.Sales”‖“dc=.International” ∈ IDs, i.e., the domain com-
ponent is revoked, then all the data users in this domain component will be revoked
as well. Therefore, the DUR-CP-ABE scheme not only supports individual user re-
vocation but also supports affiliation-based revocation.
4.2.4 Security Model
I make the following security assumptions of cloud storage systems. First, the
cloud server is honest but curious. The cloud server honestly follows the designated
protocol, but curiously infers additional sensitive information based on the data avail-
able to him. Active attacks such as deleting or tampering with the stored data are
out of scope in this thesis. Second, the cloud server might provide data access per-
mission to unauthorized users either on purpose for more benefits or because of data
leakage events. Third, the users are dishonest and may collude together in order to
gain access privileges that they individually do not have. There are three categories
of collusion. First attribute collusion: two non-revoked users A and B with attribute
set SA = {A1, A2} and SB = {A3, A4} might collude in order to decrypt a ciphertext
under access policy A1&A4. Second, a revoked user A whose attributes satisfy the
access policy and a non-revoked user B whose attributes do not satisfy the access pol-
icy might collude together to try to gain data access permission. Third, two revoked
users A and B whose attributes both satisfy the access policy might collude together
to gain higher access permission.
To resist against the attacks above, I describe the security model for the DUR-
CP-ABE system by the game between a challenger C and an adversary A as follows.
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The DUR-CP-ABE security model is formalized by the game between a challenger
and an adversary A as follows.
• Init: The adversary A commits to a challenge access structure A∗ and a revoked
identity set IDs∗ and sends them to the challenger.
• Setup: The challenger runs the setup algorithm. The generated master secret
key MSK is kept secret and the public parameters PP and the set of public
attributes key {PKx} are given to the adversary.
• Phase1: The adversary A makes repeated private key queries (Si, IDi)i∈[1,q1]
with two constrains: (1) if Si ∈ A∗, then IDi ∈ IDs∗; (2) if IDi /∈ IDs∗, then
Si /∈ A∗.
• Challenge: The adversary sends to the challenger two randomly selected equal
length messages M0 and M1. The challenger picks up a random bit b ∈ {0, 1},
and encrypts Mb under the access structure A∗ and the revoked identity set
IDs∗. The generated challenge ciphertext CT∗ is sent back to the adversary A.
• Phase2: Repeat Phase1 with the same constrains.
• Guess: The adversary outputs a guess bit b′ of b.
Definition 4.2. Define AdvA = |Pr[b′ = b]− 12 | as the advantage of the adversary A
winning the game above. The DUR-CP-ABE scheme is secure if AdvA of any PPT
adversary A is a negligible function 1 of the security parameter.
1A function µ(x) : N → R is negligible. If for every positive polynomial poly(·) there
exists an integer Npoly > 0 such that for all x > Npoly, |µ(x)| < 1poly(x) , reference link:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Negligible function
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4.3 Attribute-Based Access Control with Discretionary Revocation
In this section, I first present an overview of the proposed revocation approach
and then provide a detailed construction.
4.3.1 Overview
I used the idea of revocation by redundant equations. Let the encryption algo-
rithm define several “local” revocation equations. Use a “two equation” method for
decryption. Intuitively, when decrypting, a user ID will apply his/her secret key to
the ciphertext. If ID /∈ IDs, he/she will get two independent equations and be able
to extract the randomness used to mask the message. However, if ID ∈ IDs (i.e., he
is revoked), then he will only get two dependent equations of a two variable formula
and thus be unable to extract the randomness. Alternatively, the ciphertext cand be
regarded as locally defining a degree one polynomial. A user ID will get two points
on a fresh degree one polynomial if ID /∈ IDs (and otherwise the user will essentially
only get one point on the polynomial, which is not enough to solve). This could be
considered as a local revocation of each user to a ciphertext.
To resist against collusion attacks described in the security model, the key shares
are randomized or “personalized” to each user to prevent combination of decryption
shares. The cancelation techniques based on the power of a bilinear map is utilized
in the construction.
4.3.2 Proposed Access Control System Construction
Let G be a bilinear group of prime order p, and let g be the generator of G. All the
string-format identities can be encoded as an element in Zp through a hash function
{0, 1}∗ → Zp. The proposed system consists of the following four components.
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Setting Up the System: The TA initializes the system by running the Setup
algorithm. In particular, it chooses random exponents α, b ∈ Zp as the master secret
key MSK = {α, b}. Then it generates the public parameters as follows.
PP =
(
g, gb, gb
2
, e(g, g)α
)
For each attribute x ∈ U, the TA generates a random group element hxh ∈ G for
each layer of the organizational trees structure. The following public attribute keys
PKx are generated.
PKx = {hbxh}h∈[1,H]
Generating Secret Key for Users: When a new user joins the system, the TA
will assign it a set of attributes based on its role or identity. Based on the assigned
attributes and identity in the organizational structure, the TA then generates secret
keys for the user by running the KeyGen algorithm. It takes as inputs the master
secret key MSK, the set of attributes S that describes the user’s ID. Assume the user’s
ID is on the H ′th layer (1 ≤ H ′ ≤ H). It chooses a random t ∈ Zp and generates the
user’s secret key in the following format and sends it to the user in a secure way.
SK = (K = gαgb
2t, Kx, L = g
−t), where
Kx = {Kxh = (gb·ID|hhxh)t}∀x∈S,h∈[1,H], ID|h=ID (h∈[H′,H])
Encrypting Data: The data owner will process the data to be outsourced with a
hybrid encryption method as described in the system model. Therefore, the encrypted
message of the access control system will be a data encryption key K. The Encrypt
algorithm works as follows. It takes as inputs the public parameters PP, the set
of public attribute keys {PKx}, a data encryption key K, an access policy A that
can be denoted by an LSSS access structure (M,ρ) and the revoked identity set
IDs = {ID1, · · · , IDr} constructed by querying the IAM server or on its own (e.g.,
revoke only one user whose ID is known). M is an ` × n share-generating matrix
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where ` denotes the number of attributes involved in the encryption. ρ is a function
associating rows of M to attributes. IDj (j ∈ [1, r]) is on the H thj layer in the
organizational structure.
It chooses a random vector v = (s, y2, · · · , yn) ∈ Znp and for k ∈ [1, l] calculates
λk = v ·Mk where Mk denotes the vector corresponding to the k-th row in the matrix
M . It chooses random µ1, ..., µr ∈ Zp such that µ = µ1 + ... + µr. The ciphertext of
the message K in the following format is uploaded onto the cloud server by the data
owner.
For revocation of a single user, the ciphertext is:
CT = (C,C ′, Cˆ, (M,ρ), ID′), where
C =Me(g, g)αs,
C ′ = gs,
Cˆ = {Cˆk = gb·λk , Cˆ ′k = (gb2·ID′hbρ(k)H′)λk}k∈[1,l]
For revocation of multiple users, the ciphertext is:
CT = (C,C ′, Cˆ, (M,ρ), IDs), where
C = Ke(g, g)αsµ,
C ′ = gsµ,
Cˆ = {Cˆk,j = gb·λkµj , Cˆ ′k,j = (gb2·IDjhbρ(k)Hj)λkµj}
j∈[1,r]
k∈[1,l]
Decrypting Data: The data user firstly downloads the encrypted data from the
cloud server and then runs the Decrypt algorithm of the ABE scheme to obtain the
data encryption keys and decrypts the data blocks with these DEKs. Here is how the
Decrypt algorithm works. It takes as inputs CT which is the input ciphertext with
an access structure (M,ρ) and a revoked identity IDj and secret key SK for a set of
attributes S and the identity ID. Suppose that S satisfies the access structure and let
I ⊂ [1, l] be defined as I = {i : ρ(i) ∈ S}. Let {ωi ∈ Zp}i∈I be a set of constants such
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that if {λi}i∈I are valid shares of any secret s according to M , then Σi∈Iωiλi = s. If
the condition ID /∈ IDs holds, calculate A as follows. The value e(g, g)αsµ could be
obtained by evaluating e(C
′,K)
A
. The decryption algorithm then divides out this value
from the ciphertext component C and obtains the message K.
A =
r∏
j=1
∏
i∈I
[e(Kρ(i)Hj , Cˆk,j) · e(L, Cˆ ′k,j)]
ωi
ID|Hj−IDj
For a revocation set IDs = {ID1, · · · , IDr}, Encrypt creates an exponent µ ∈ Zp
and splits it into r random shares µ1, · · · , µr. For each share, the ciphertext has
two components Cˆk,j and Cˆ
′
k,j. If ID|Hj = IDj, it will get two linearly dependent
equations and the exponent b2tλiµj(ID|Hj − IDj) will be 0, thus unable to solve the
system; otherwise it gets e(g, g)b
2stµ. If IDj is a domain component’s identity, then
the component KxHj in the user secret key will not work, thus achieving affiliated
revocation.
The decryption for ciphertext revoking a single user and multiple users are as
follows respectively.
A =
∏
i∈I[e(Kρ(i)H′ , Cˆi) · e(L, Cˆ ′i)]
ωi
ID−ID′
= (
∏
i∈I[e((g
b·IDhρ(i)H′)t, gb·λi)
·e(g−t, (gb2·ID′hbρ(i)H′)λi)]
ωi
ID−ID′
= (
∏
i∈I[e(g
b·ID·t, gb·λi) · e(htρ(i)H′ , gb·λi)
·e(g−t, gb2·ID′·λi) · e(g−t, hb·λiρ(i)H′)]
ωi
ID−ID′
= (
∏
i∈I [e(g
b·ID·t, gb·λi) · e(g−t, gb2·ID′·λi)]ωi)1/(ID−ID′)
= (
∏
i∈I[e(g, g)
b2tλi(ID−ID′)]
ωi
ID−ID′
=
∏
i∈I e(g, g)
b2tλiωi
= e(g, g)b
2t
∑
i∈I λiωi
= e(g, g)b
2ts
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A =
∏r
j=1(
∏
i∈I[e((g
b·ID|Hjhρ(i)Hj)
t, gb·λiµj)
·e(g−t, (gb2·ID′jhbρ(i)Hj)λiµj)]
ωi
ID|Hj−IDj
=
∏r
j=1(
∏
i∈I[e(g, g)
b2tλiµj(ID|Hj−IDj)]
ωi
ID|Hj−IDj
=
∏r
j=1(
∏
i∈I e(g, g)
b2tλiωiµj)
=
∏r
j=1 e(g, g)
b2tµj
∑
i∈I λiωi
=
∏r
j=1 e(g, g)
b2tµjs
= e(g, g)b
2st
∑r
j=1 µj
= e(g, g)b
2stµ.
4.4 Analysis and Evaluation
4.4.1 Security Analysis
M-q-parallel-BDHE. The definition of the modified (decisional) q parallel Bi-
linear Diffie-Hellman Exponent problem is as follows. Choose a group G of prime
order p, a random generator g of G and random a, s, b1, b2, · · · , bq ∈ Zp. Given
y ={g, gs, ga, · · · , g(aq), , g(aq+2), · · · , g(a2q),
∀1≤i≤q ga/bi , · · · , gaq/bi , , gaq+2/bi , ..., ga2q/bi ,
∀1≤j≤q ga·s/bj , · · · , gaq ·s/bj},
it is hard for a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary to distinguish e(g, g)a
q+1s
from a random element R ∈ GT . An algorithm B that outputs z ∈ {0, 1} has advan-
tage  in solving the M-q-parallel-BDHE problem if the follwing equation holds.
|Pr[B(y, T = e(g, g)aq+1s) = 0]− Pr[B(y, T = R) = 0]| ≥ .
The M-q-parallel-BDHE assumption holds if the advantage  of any PPT adver-
sary B to solve the M-q-parallel-BDHE problem is a negligible function of the security
parameter.
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Theorem 4.1. The Modified (decisional) q parallel Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent
assumption generically holds.
Proof. Using the terminology from BBG Waters (2011) “f = aq+1s is independent
of the polynomials P and Q” is needed to be proven. I set Q = {1} since all given
terms are in the bilinear group and
P = {1, s,∀i∈[1,2q],j∈[1,q],i 6=q+1ai, ai/bj, ai · s/bj}.
Choose a generator u. Set g = u
∏
j∈[1,q] bj . All the above terms are substituted
by a set of polynomials with the maximum degree 3q + 1. Now, check whether f is
symbolically independent of any two polynomials in P and Q. To realize f from P
and Q, a term of the form am+1s is needed. Whereas, no such terms can be realized
from the product of any two polynomials p, p′ ∈ P . To form such a term, a polynomial
with a single factor of s is needed. If s is used as p, then p′ has to be aq+1 which
doesn’t exist in P . If p = ai · s/bj, there always exists bj, which cannot be canceled.
Hence it can be concluded that the M -q-parallel-BDHE assumption is generically
secure.
The security of the proposed scheme can be concluded by the following Theorems.
Theorem 4.2. Suppose that the M-q-parallel-BDHE assumption holds. Then no PPT
adversary can selectively break the DUR-CP-ABE scheme with a challenge access
structure
(
M∗, ρ∗
)
, where the size of M∗ is `∗ × n∗ and `∗, n∗ ≤ q.
Proof Sketch: The basic idea of the proof is using the reduction technology as
shown Figure. 4.4, where a simulator is constructed to simulate a DUR-CP-ABE
game for the attacker by answering its queries and programming the challenge access
structure together with the revoked identity set into the public parameters and the
set of public attribute keys.
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Figure 4.4: Process of Reduction to the M-q-BDHE Problem.
I present the proof for the DUR-CP-ABE scheme with only one revoked identity.
The proof of the scheme with multiple revoked identities can be obtained by adapting
the following proof easily.
Proof. Init The simulator takes in an M-q-BDHE challenge {y, T}. Then the ad-
versary declares the revoked identity ID∗ and gives the simulator the challenge
access structure A∗ that is described by (M∗, ρ∗), where M∗ has n∗ (less than q)
columns. Let the challenge matrix M∗ = (
−→
M∗1 , · · · ,
−→
M∗l )
T , where each row vector
−→
M∗i = (M
∗
i,1, · · · ,M∗i,n) for 1 ≤ i ≤ l.
Setup The simulator chooses a random value α′ and lets e(g, g)α = e(g, g)α
′
e(ga, ga
q
)
to implicitly set α = α′ + aq+1. Moreover, let gb = ga, gb
2
= (ga
2
) to implicitly set
b = a.
To embed ID∗ and (M∗, ρ∗) in {hbxi}x∈U,i∈[1,H], I regard the challenge matrix M∗
as a row vector set and divide it into three subsets M∗′, M∗′′ and M∗′′′ such that
M∗′ ∪M∗′′ ∪M∗′′′ = M∗ and M∗′ ∩M∗′′ ∩M∗′′′ = ∅. Specifically, M∗′, M∗′′ and M∗′′′
are initially set to be empty set. Define the n-dimension vectors −→e = (1, 0, ..., 0) and
−→µ = (a2, a3, ..., an+1). For i = 1 to l, if −→M∗i is linearly independent on M∗′ and −→e
cannot be linearly expressed by M∗′ ∪ {−→M∗i }, then I merge
−→
M∗i into M
∗′; if
−→
M∗i is
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linearly independent on M∗′ and −→e can be linearly expressed by M∗′ ∪ {−→M∗i }, then I
merge
−→
M∗i into M
∗′′′; if
−→
M∗i is linearly dependent on M
∗′, then I merge
−→
M∗i into M
∗′′.
As a result, M∗′ is a linear independent vector group while each vector in M∗′′ can be
linearly expressed by M∗′. Although −→e cannot be spanned by M∗′, it can be linearly
expressed by M∗′ merged with each vector in M∗′′′. Therefore, each vector in M can
be linearly expressed by M∗′ ∪ {−→e }.
Next, I describe how the simulator “programs” {hbxi}x∈U,i∈[1,H]. X denotes the
set of indices i so that ρ∗(i) = x. Assume there are m vectors in M∗′ and M∗′ =
(
−−→
M∗′1 , · · · ,
−−→
M∗′m)
T . For i ∈ X, its row vector −→M∗i can be written as εi0−→e + εi1
−−→
M∗′1 +
· · · + εim
−−→
M∗′m, where (εi0, εi1, · · · , εim) ∈ Zmp . For each
−→
M∗i , define a vector
−−→
M∗∗i ,
where
−−→
M∗∗i = εi1
−−→
M∗′1 + · · · + εim
−−→
M∗′m. As a result, I get a new vector group M
∗∗ =
(
−−→
M∗∗1 , · · · ,
−−→
M∗∗l ) and each
−−→
M∗∗i is in the span of M
∗′. By choosing a random value zxi,
the simulator programs hxi and h
b
xi as follows:
hxh = g
zxhg−aID
∗
|h
∏
i∈X g
(εi1
−−→
M∗′1 +,··· ,+εim
−−→
M∗′m)·−→µ /bi
hbxh = g
zxhg−a
2ID∗|h(
∏
i∈X
∏n
j=1 g
M∗∗i,ja
j+1/bi).
If X is an empty set, I set hbxh = g
zxh . Then the simulator publishes the above
parameters (g, gb, gb
2
, {hbxh}x∈U,h∈[1,H], e(g, g)α) as the public parameters.
Phase I For a query (S, ID), the simulator constructs the private key as follows.
Since each
−−→
M∗∗i is in the span of M
∗′ while −→e is not in the span of M∗′, I can still
find a vector −→ω with ω1 = −1 and −→ω · −−→M∗∗i = 0, where 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
Therefore, the simulator selects a random value r and calculates the private key
L as
L = gr+
−→ω ·−→ν = gr
∏
i=1,··· ,n∗
(ga
q−i
)ωi ,
which implicitly sets the randomness t as
t = r +−→ω · −→ν = r + ω1aq−1 + ω2aq−2+, · · · ,+ωnaq−n∗ ,
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where −→ν = (aq−1, aq−2, · · · , aq−n∗+2). Since ga2t contains a term of g−aq+1 the un-
known term in gα can be canceled when creating the K component in the private key.
The simulator constructs K as follows.
K = gα
′
ga
2r
∏
i=0,··· ,n−2
(ga
q+i
)ωi .
For ∀x ∈ S, if there is no i such that ρ∗(i) = x, the simulator simply sets Kxh =
Lzxh . For those used in the challenge access structure, it must be ensured that there
are no terms of the form ga
q+1/bi that the simulator cannot simulate. Since −→w ·M∗∗′i =
0, all of these terms can be canceled. Define X as the set of all i such that ρ∗(i) = x,
the simulator creates Kxh as follows.
Kxh =(g
zxhga(ID|h−ID
∗
|h)
∏
i∈X
g
−−→
M∗∗i ·−→µ /bi)(r+
−→w ·−→ν )
Challenge In this phase, the adversary provides to the simulator two challenge mes-
sages M0, M1 with the challenge matrix M of dimension at most n∗ columns.
First, The simulator flips a coin β and creates the ciphertext component C =
MβT · e(gs, gα′), C ′ = gs. Then the simulator chooses random value y′2, y′3, · · · , y′n
and share the secret s using the vector
−→v = (s, y′2, y′3, · · · , y′n).
Next, it calculates
λk =
−→v · (εk0−→e + εk1
−−→
M∗′1 + εk2
−−→
M∗′2 + ...+ εkm
−−→
M∗′m)
And it generates the ciphertext component C∗k as:
Cˆk = g
as(M∗∗k1+εk0) ·
n∏
i=2
gM
∗∗
ki y
′
i
For k = 1, · · · , n∗, Xk is defined as the set of the index i in such that ρ(i) = ρ(k).
Finally, the simulator builds the ciphertext component C ′k as:
Cˆ ′k =(g
a2ID∗gzxH′g−a
2ID∗
∏
i∈Xk
g
−−→
M∗∗i ·−→µ /bi)λk
51
Phase II Same as Phase I.
Guess The adversary will eventually output a guess β′ of β. The simulator then
outputs 0 to guess that T = e(g, g)sa
q+1
if β′ = β; otherwise, it outputs 1 to indicate
that it believes T is a random group element in GT . When T is a tuple the simulator
B gives a perfect simulation so that
Pr[B(−→X,T = e(g, g)saq+1) = 0] = 1
2
+ AdvA.
When T is a random group element, the message Mβ is completely hidden from
the adversary and Pr[B(−→X, T = R) = 0] = 1
2
. Therefore, B can play the modified
decisional q-parallels BDHE game with non-negligible advantage.
Theorem 4.3. The DUR-CP-ABE scheme is resistant against unauthorized access.
Proof. As discussed in the security model, there are two categories of unauthorized
accesses: 1) one unauthorized user whose attributes do not satisfy the access policy
or is revoked by the data owner; 2) two unauthorized colluding users.
The first scenario is stated directly in the the query constrains, i.e., any PPT ad-
versary who is not allowed to ask for a secret key with eligible attributes for the access
policy A∗ and non-revoked identity can guess correctly which message is encrypted
with only a negligible probability.
For the second scenario, let’s look into the detailed construction. The key shares
for both attributes and revoked identities are “personalized” to each user to prevent
combination of decryption shares. In particular, each user’s secret key is random-
ized by an exponent t such that when decrypting each user recovers shares tλiwiµj
where λiwi corresponds to the attributes and µj associates with the revoked user IDj.
Therefore, the secret keys of two users can not work together to recover tsµ which is
the key to successful decryption.
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4.4.2 Performance Analysis
In this section, I analyze the propsed construction in terms of computation, stor-
age, and communication overhead. Since the scheme is constructed based on the
CP-ABE scheme by Waters in Waters (2011) (denoted by W-CP-ABE), which itself
and adapted constructions are broadly used Akinyele et al. (2011); Lai et al. (2013);
Akinyele et al. (2013), I use this scheme as the baseline. To demonstrate how the size
of the revoked identity set influences the overheads of the system, Let “O-DUR-CP-
ABE” denote the scheme where r = 1 and “M-DUR-CP-ABE” denote the scheme
where r > 1.
In the following sections, let m denote the number of attributes defined in the
system; H is the number of layers in the organizational structure tree; r is the number
of revoked identities; S indicates the set of attributes entitled to a user; l denotes the
number of attributes involved in encryption; |I| is the number of attributes (subset
of S) used in decryption.
There are four types of time-consuming operations in all the schemes, i.e., pairing,
exponentiation, multiplication and inversion. According to Li et al. (2014), the pairing
and exponentiation operations take the dominant computation costs. Therefore, I
use the number of pairing and exponentiation operations as metrics for computation
complexity.
Computation Complexity Analysis
Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 present computation costs comparisons of the three schemes.
In the Setup algorithm of all these three schemes, there is only one pairing operation
that is brought by evaluating e(g, g)α. In W-CP-ABE, the number of exponentiations
is m + 3. In the other two schemes, there are mH + 3 exponentiation operations
53
Table 4.1: Computation Complexity Comparison in terms of the Number of Pairing
Operations
Schemes W-CP-ABE O-DUR-CP-ABE M-DUR-CP-ABE
Setup 1 1 1
KeyGen 0 0 0
Encrypt 0 0 0
Decrypt 2|I|+ 1 2|I|+ 1 2|I|r + 1
because of the organizational structure. In the KeyGen algorithm of W-CP-ABE,
the number of exponentiations is |S| + 3. In the two DUR-CP-ABE schemes, this
number increases to H|S|+H ′+3. The increment comes from the fact that all layers
in a user’s identity structure are embedded in the key component for each attribute.
For the Encrypt algorithm of W-CP-ABE, the number of exponentiation opera-
tions is 3l + 2. In O-DUR-CP-ABE, the number is 2l + 3. In M-DUR-CP-ABE, the
number is (2l + 1)r + 2. In W-CP-ABE, the number of pairing needed for decryp-
tion is 2|I|+ 1, which is the same as that of O-DUR-CP-ABE. The number increases
to 2|I|r + 1 in M-DUR-CP-ABE. The number of exponentiations in W-CP-ABE,
O-DUR-CP-ABE and M-DUR-CP-ABE is |I|, |I|, and |I|r. Increased overhead in
M-DUR-CP-ABE is due to multiple user revocation.
Storage and Communication Overhead Analysis
The main storage overheads come from the Setup algorithm and KeyGen algorithm.
The communication overheads come from the ciphertext generated by the encryp-
tion algorithm. Table 4.3 and Table 4.4 summarize the storage and communication
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Table 4.2: Computation Complexity Comparison in terms of the Number of Expo-
nentiation Operations
Schemes W-CP-ABE O-DUR-CP-ABE M-DUR-CP-ABE
Setup m+ 3 mH + 3 mH + 3
KeyGen |S|+ 3 H|S|+H ′ + 3 H|S|+H ′ + 3
Encrypt 3l + 2 2l + 3 (2l + 1)r + 2
Decrypt |I| |I| |I|r
Table 4.3: Storage Overhead Comparison
Schemes W-CP-ABE O-DUR-CP-ABE M-DUR-CP-ABE
Setup m+ 4 Hm+ 6 Hm+ 6
KeyGen |S|+ 2 H|S|+ 3 H|S|+ 3
overhead of the three schemes.
The storage overhead in the Setup algorithm of W-CP-ABE is m+ 4. In the two
DUR-CP-ABE schemes, it is mH + 6 because of the public attribute keys generated
for the organizational structure. In W-CP-ABE, the overhead of storing a private
key is |S| + 2. In the two DUR-CP-ABE schemes, the private key storage overhead
increases to H|S| + 3. The ciphertext size of W-CP-ABE, O-DUR-CP-ABE and
M-DUR-CP-ABE is 2l + 2, 2l + 2, and 2lr + 2 respectively.
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Table 4.4: Communication Overhead Comparison
Schemes W-CP-ABE O-DUR-CP-ABE M-DUR-CP-ABE
Encrypt 2l + 2 2l + 2 2lr + 2
4.4.3 Implementation and Testing Results
The proposed scheme are implemented in C using PBC library Lynn (2006) on
Ubuntu 14.04. All of the results are obtained by running the programs ten times.
To evaluate the relations between the number of attributes and the computation
overhead, I set r to 1 and H to 2, i.e., only one identity is revoked and the height of
the organizational tree is 3.
Figure 4.5: Relations between the Number of Attributes and Time Consumption for
Setup.
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Figure 4.6: Relations between the Number of Attributes and Time Consumption for
Key Generation.
Figure. 4.7 and Figure. 4.8 show that the discretionary revocation does not
increase the computation overhead on both the Data Owner end where encryption is
performed and the User end where decryption is performed.
Figure. 4.6 demonstrates that when H is set to be 2, the key generation overhead
of O-DUR-CP-ABE is around two times the overhead of W-CP-ABE. H influences
the added overhead, whereas in practice usually H ≤ 10 (i.e., a small constant), thus
the added overhead can be handled easily taking into consideration the increasing
computing speed of enterprise servers. From Figure. 4.5, O-DUR-CP-ABE will take
much longer time to initialize the system. The good news is the Setup algorithm
will be run only once. Furthermore, compared with the attribute-based revocation
solutions where the TA has to generate and distribute private updating information
of revoked attributes for each data owner discretionary user revocation, this one-time
overhead is dominantly more efficient.
57
Figure 4.7: Relations between the Number of Attributes and Time Consumption for
Encryption.
Figure. 4.9 shows that the computation complexity of the Encrypt and Decrypt
algorithm is linear in r. To build a desired broadcast group, there exist trade-offs
between system scalability, key storage overhead and computation overhead. Con-
sidering the cloud storage application scenarios and the ever-increasing computing
speeds, system scalability is much more important than computation overheads. As-
sume that users with compromised key can be handled by attribute-based revocation,
the data owner does not need to worry about these users, instead it just excludes few
undesired ones in the group built with the access policy. Since the access policy has
already narrowed down the target group, the number of revoked users will gener-
ally be small. Moreover, taking the affiliation-based revocation into consideration, in
practice, the complexity could be further decreased.
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Figure 4.8: Relations between the Number of Attributes and Time Consumption for
Decryption.
4.5 Summary
In this chapter, I investigate the problem of how to revoke users when applying the
CP-ABE scheme for secure data sharing. Different from the previous researches on
attribute-based revocation, our approach focuses on identity-based revocation mech-
anism. The revocation mechanism remedies the deficiencies of attribute-based revo-
cation that cannot work without the help of the trusted authority and provides more
flexible and efficient affiliation-based revocation. I propose the primitive of DUR-CP-
ABE, give its security definition and present the constructions. Through analysis and
experimental evaluation, I validate the security and efficiency of the proposed scheme.
DUR-CP-ABE adds the broadcast encryption (BE) technique Fiat and Naor (1993)
by Lewko and Sahai (LS for simplicity) Lewko et al. (2010) conjunctively to a CP-
ABE scheme Waters (2011). In LS, the size of public and private keys is a constant
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Figure 4.9: Relations between the Number of Revoked Identities and Time Consump-
tion in M-DUR-CP-ABE.
number and the public key allows data owners to encrypt an unbounded number of
users, thus is efficient and scalable. Although there exists an BE system Naor et al.
(2001) (denoted by NNL) with ciphetext size O(log n) which is smaller than r when
r = O(n), in this work I adopted LS because: first, the private key size of NNL is
(O(log n))2; second, with ABE, the access structure has narrowed down the size of
candidate authorized users to be much smaller than n, so in practice r is usually much
smaller than log n, especially when I consider affiliated user revocation.
There are several research issues need to be further investigated. In this work
all the private components of a user’s private key are obtained from a single trusted
authority, in the next chapter I will investigate how to delegate key generation to the
organizations in the hierarchical management structure tree and provide more salient
features for practical applications.
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Chapter 5
EXTENDED ABE SCHEME SUPPORTING FEDERATION, DELEGATION
AND INTER-OPERABILITY
This chapter focuses on the problem of extending the identity revocable ABE
scheme presented in the last chapter to support federation, delegation and inter-
operability features. I will introduce the background of this problem, present the new
ABE scheme and describe performance evaluation.
5.1 Background
5.1.1 A Motivation Use Case
I use an IoT-based application in healthcare as the use-case study. Device-to-
device communication in IoT are envisaged through various communication protocols,
e.g., Message Queue Telemetry Transport (MQTT) Hunkeler et al. (2008), MQTT
for sensor networks (MQTT-SN), which have been used by various applications in
social networks, remote healthcare, vehicle to vehicle communication, and sensor net-
works. Existing communication protocols for IoT have limited or devoid of security
features. Thus, embedding secure data access control into data can significantly re-
duce the overhead and complexity on maintaining an uniform access infrastructure on
all involved data storage services, and thus break the barrier for data sharing among
different administrative domains. As shown in Figure. 5.1, MQTT is a Publisher-
Subscriber protocol for data owners to share information with data users through a
broker. I will discuss this in the context of a healthcare use-case. In the future, hos-
pitals will be digitized and full of networked medical devices that constantly interact
with each other. For example, a blood sugar monitor need to send data to the tablet
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Figure 5.1: An Example of DC-ABAC Secured IoT.
of an attending physician or nurse, to intravenous fluid pumps, to the pharmacy, to
medical record logging devices, to diagnostics devices that use data, to consulting
physicians in other hospitals, to family members that requested data on their smart-
phones, etc. The web of information sharing will be extremely complex and dynamic.
HIPAA regulations require that medical data should be kept private. That means
the data must be protected through access control. It also means that the access
control policy must be fine-grained enough to ensure that access is granted to and
only to authorized people or devices. HIPPA also demands individual rights HIPAA
(2017) to access and manage their health and medical data. The patient must be
able to take possession of their healthcare data and share the data in their desired
way. The access control must be flexible enough to grant access to arbitrary users. A
good solution to the data access control in this application scenario is CP-ABE-based
attribute-based access control. In particular, the publisher device encrypts data based
on access policies specified by the data owner. Later, a subscriber is able to decrypt
the ciphertext if he/she has the attributes that satisfy the access policy associated
with the ciphertext.
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Figure 5.2: An Example of Hospital Organization structure.
I present this solution as Data-Centric ABAC (DC-ABAC). A part of hospital
management framework example is shown in Figure. 5.2, where patients may interact
with multiple divisions/offices of an hospital. A patient can keep his/her health-care
and medical data and provide it to corresponding parties for various healthcare situa-
tions, and a doctor is usually associated with a division and may temporarily affiliate
with another hospital. Therefore, trust must be established among the coalition of
hospitals.
5.1.2 Design Features and Solutions
To achieve the above described application scenario, several important access con-
trol management features need to be addressed. Since ABE-based ABAC relies on
the cryptographic algorithm, these capabilities need to be addressed by the ABE
algorithm itself.
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Federation
According to dictionary.com, a federation is “a federated body formed by a number
of nations, states, societies, unions, etc., each retaining control of its own internal
affairs”. Take the aforementioned hospital use case as an example: hospital A and
B are federated. The desired feature is that common attributes of hospital A and
hospital B could be used in both hospitals. For example, data encrypted by an access
policy “MRI image” by a data owner in hospital A could be decrypted by a data user
in hospital B with the attribute “MRI image”. This requires that the cryptographic
parameters should be shared among different hospitals. Generating a common public
parameter requires to have a common Trusted Authority (TA), who has the master
secret key for each hospital.
However, it is impossible for all hospitals to select a single hospital to play the
role of this trusted authority. Even if they could get one candidate, this might be
against data privacy laws. Another problem is that this is highly risky. Once the TA
got compromised, the data within the federation will all be leaked.
To deal with this issue, in this chapter, I design a protocol involving a coalition of
trusted authorities. In particular, the approach is based on a secure multiple party
computation protocol running among a of selected participating organizations (say
n) to generate system parameters and private keys for the root authority of each
organization. The presented solution is resistant against n−1−out−of−n collusion
attack among the trusted authorities. Therefore, even n − 1 participating trusted
authorities are compromised, the data within the federation is still secure.
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Delegation
ABE schemes require a Trusted Authority (TA) to generate users’ private keys, where
an ABE key generation authority can grant full or partial of its key generation priv-
ileges to one or multiple delegators. Delegating TA’s key generation capabilities can
not only relieve the single-point failure issue, but also naturally follow the organiza-
tion’s hierarchical management structure. Following the hospital’s hierarchical man-
agement structure, the delegation is flowing down to the bottom level above patients.
Doctors, nurses, and other hospital employees can derive their attributes and the
corresponding private keys at their registration delegator, namely parent delegator.
To achieve the delegation feature from a parent to a delegation node (or called
child), I design a delegation protocol to allow a parent node to securely delegate
its key generation capability to its children. A child can fully or partially inherit
the parent’s key generation capability based on secrets shared between them. Chil-
dren delegators cannot collude to derive more capability beyond their delegated key
generation capabilities.
Interoperability
In practice, users need to interact with several different organizations that may not
trust each other; a user also may own attributes belonged to different subdivisions
of an organization. Moreover, at the organization level, it is difficult to find a root
authority to generate private keys for all the users in these organizations. In the
presented example, a doctor belongs to the hospital A’s emergency room and he also
affiliates with hospital B in the medical laboratory (imaging division), and thus he
can derive two attributes from two delegators in the trust hierarchy and the doctor
should be able to use them together.
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To achieve the interoperability feature, a closest common ancestor is needed to
assist two delegators to issue the private keys for a user. To follow the hierarchical
delegation trust framework and prevent collusion issue where two delegators sharing
secret to generate secret keys for a user, the presented protocol incorporates a random
exponent in each generated private keys to enforce the interoperability protocol must
go through the closest ancestor.
Revocation
Revocation is an inherently difficult problem in public key cryptographic algorithms.
Existing ABE schemes mainly incorporate a ”NOT” logic gate to revoke an attribute
when constructing an access policy tree, which may not provide the level of gran-
ularity or accuracy. For example, when revoking one specific doctor using a policy
¬(emergency room) cannot easily identify the revoked user, and more attributes need
to be involved. As a result, using a unique identifier for a user or a group is a natural
approach and can be easily adopted. Previous approaches Yamada et al. (2014) treat
a group ID or a user’s ID as an attribute, and then it is simple to revoke a known
group of entities or individuals by implementing the “NOT” logic on the attribute in
the ABE scheme. However, this approach will significantly increase the size of the
attribute set and make attributes management extremely complicated when the user-
group is large. To address this issue, the solution is to incorporate users’ and groups’
IDs into their allocated private keys. In this way, a user or a group (e.g., a group
generated under one delegator) can be revoked directly by revoking their IDs. The
solution will be compatible with traditional attribute-based revocation, and a data
owner can build an access policy with both attributes and a set of revoked identities.
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5.2 System and Models
5.2.1 DC-ABAC Trust Framework
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Figure 5.3: DC-ABAC System and Models.
The overall DC-ABAC trust framework is presented in Figure. 5.3, which follows
a decentralized trust architecture. At the top, the Trust Coalition (TC) is in charge
of all attributes’ registration Att(All) and public security parameters management.
I propose to use TC to avoid the single point failure issue. Using a multi-party
computation protocol, a private key delegation model, where neither a single trusted
authority nor a subset of trusted authorities can generate a valid private key for an
attribute, can be created.
Delegation follows the hierarchical trust framework. Under TC, multiple organi-
zations exist to manage their attributes, e.g., Att(i), where i = 1, k.., n, |Att(All)| =
|Att(1)| ∪ · · · ∪ |Att(n)|, and |Att(i)| ∩ |Att(k)| may not be empty φ. Each organiza-
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tion can form their own trust domain by establishing a hierarchical trust framework,
where the organization’s root node needs to register its managed attributes at the
top level, and it can delegate its key generation capabilities to delegators at a lower
level, e.g., Att(1)→ Att(1, ∗) and Att(1, 1)→ Att(1, 1, 1).
5.2.2 Security Model
Compared to traditional access control model, where the data storage service
provider is usually fully trusted, in the DC-ABAC solution, the storage servers and
communication network are assumed to be honest-but-curious. They might do some
statistical analysis over the encrypted data or collude with some unauthorized data
users to obtain access to protected data.
As for entities in the organizational structure, they are divided into four categories:
data owner, data consumer/user, authorities, and members of the trust coalition. The
data owner is fully trusted. The data consumer is assumed to be dishonest, i.e., they
may collude to access data that they do not have access privileges. In particular, data
consumer A with private key SKA linked with attribute set UA and data consumer
B with private key SKB linked with attribute set UB (both key is generated by the
protocol External Delegation and UA 6= UB) might collude together in order to gain
access privilege extracted from attribute set UA ∪ UB.
Within one organization, assume that there are two authorities DA1 and DA2 with
the closest ancestor authority P . DA1 and DA2 has private delegation key for gener-
ating private keys for attribute set Att1 and Att2 respectively (Att1 6= Att2). These
two domain authorities might want to obtain more access privileges without the au-
thorization from their common ancestor domain authorities, say constructing access
policies from attribute set Att1∪Att2. DA1 and DA2 could either be domain author-
ities within an organization or two root authorities of two different organizations. If
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they are two authorities within an organization, it is the protocol Internal-Delegation
to guarantee the collusion security problem. If they are two root authorities, the
Federated Key Generation protocol should be designed to resist against the collusion
problem.
Assume that the members in the trusted coalition will not collude with the or-
ganizations but parts of the members of the trusted coalition might collude together
aiming at controlling the whole structure, but not all of them. Assume that there
are N members in the trusted coalition and fewer than N − 1 members will collude
together, the Federated Setup protocol should resist against the collusion attack.
I will analyze each security problems in the security analysis section.
5.3 DC-ABAC Protocols
As shown in Figure. 5.3, there exist two structures among organizations, i.e.,
the inter and the inner. The inter level corresponds to the federation among mul-
tiple organizations which do not trust each other. The inner level corresponds to
the organizational structure within each individual organization. The organizational
structure is actually a tree structure. For clarity of statement, I define some termi-
nologies related with the tree structure below.
In the presentation, Root denotes the top node in a tree, e.g., the root node of
the organizational structure is Att(all). Child denotes a node directly connected to
another node, e.g., the node Att(1, 1) is the child of the node Att(1). Parent is the
converse notion of child, e.g., the node Att(1) is the parent of the node Att(1, 1).
Ancestor is a node reachable by repeatedly proceeding from child to parent, e.g., the
node Att(1) and Att(all) are the ancestor of the node Att(1, 1). External node or
leaf is a node with no children. For example, an individual user in the organizational
structure is denoted by a leaf node. Internal node is a node with at least one child.
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Level is defined by 1+(the number of connections between the node and the root), e.g.
the root authority of each organization is on Level-2 since there exists one connection
between the root authority and the Root.
For all the organizations working in a federated way, I designed a secure multiple
party system setup protocol and a secure multiple party computation key generation
protocol to generate system parameters and generate private attribute keys for the
root authority of each individual organization respectively. The selected group of
organizations have benefit collisions, thus will not collude with each other. I name
the selected group of organizations TC. The protocols run to enable the functionalities
of the DC-ABAC model are presented in the following sections.
5.3.1 Global Setup
In this phase, global parameters are negotiated between the trusted authorities.
The global parameters include the universal set of attributes denoted by U , the pair-
ing that will be used. The public parameters include the pairing e being used, the
generator g of the group G1 as well as the group elements of the attributes, denoted
by {hx}. GP = {U, g, e, {hx}x∈U}.
5.3.2 Federated Setup and Key Generation Protocol
Each member in TC= {TC1, · · · , TCN} (N is the number of members in TC)
will run the setup protocol of the ABE scheme to generate their share of the master
secret key and the public parameter and then generate the system-wide master secret
key and public parameters by running a secure multiple party computation protocol.
Figure. 5.4 shows the workflows of system setup and private key generation for
organizational root authorities. The two protocols are described as follows.
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Figure 5.4: Flowchart of Federated Setup and Key Generation.
Federation Setup
Each TC member performs computation and communication as described in Protocol
5.1. When the protocol completes, the system wide master secret key and public
parameters will be as follows
MSK = (α, b, s0)
PK = (g, gb, gb
2
, e(g, g)α, {hbx, hb
2
x }x∈U , {gbsIDj
−1
, gsID
−1
j }IDj∈Orgs)
where α =
∑N
i=1 αi, b =
∏N
i=1 bi, s0 =
∑N
i=1 si.
sIDj denotes the component generated for all the internal nodes in the tree struc-
ture. sIDj = ID
s0
j if IDj is the root authority of an organization, otherwise,
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sIDchild = ID
sIDparent
child . Orgs denotes the set of all internal nodes in the tree structure.
For statement clarity, I focus on a single root organization use case. This could be
extended to multiple organizations scenario in an easy way.
Protocol 5.1 Federated Setup
Input: Each TCi has inputs of security parameter λ, attribute set U , a prime-order
group G, the generator g of G, random elements {hx}x∈U selected from G. The
organization tree structure.
Output: The system public parameters.
1: TCi generates secret key in the format of αi, bi, si ∈ Zp, and public key in the
format of
(
gbi , gb
2
i , e(g, g)αi , (hbix , h
b2i
x )x∈U
)
.
2: If i = 1, then TC1 will calculate sID for the root organization, and at the end
got the parameters
(
gb1 , gb
2
1 , e(g, g)α1 , (hb1x , h
b21
x )x∈U , sID = IDs1
)
.
3: If i 6= 1, TCi receives parameters in the format of PKi−1 and calculates PKi
as shown below.
PKi−1 = {pk1, pk2, pk3, {pkx1, pkx2}x∈U , pksID}
PKi = {pkbi1 , pkb
2
i
2 , pk3 · e(g, g)αi , {pkbix1, pkb
2
i
x2}x∈U , pksID · IDsi}
4: If i 6= N , TCi calculates PKi and sends it to TCi+1.
5: If i = N , TCN calculates all the {gbs
−1
IDj , g
s−1IDj }IDj∈Orgs and publishes the public
parameters
PK = (g, gb, gb
2
, e(g, g)α, {hbx, hb
2
x }x∈U , {gbs
−1
IDj , g
s−1IDj }IDj∈Orgs)
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Federated Key Generation
The members of the trusted coalition work together to generate the private key for
the root authority of an organization ID as shown in Protocol 5.2. The generated
private key is in the form of SK.
SK = (K0 = g
αgb
2t, La = g
−s−1IDt, Lu = g−t, Ka = (gbsIDhbx)
t, Ku = (g
bIDhx)
t,
gbsID = gbsID , hx = hx, gbt = g
bt, ht = htx, hbt = h
bt
x , sID)x∈UID ,
where t =
∑N
i=1 ti, b =
∏N
i=1 bi, sID = ID
s, s =
∑N
i=1 si and x is in the set of at-
tributes managed by organization ID. With the private component sID, each root
authority generates private components for the domain authorities with the rule
schild = (IDchild)
sparent . gbs
−1
child and gs
−1
child are part of the system public parameters.
5.3.3 Key Generation Delegation Protocol
On the inner-organization level, the hierarchical structure naturally reflexes the
internal organizations’ authority and responsibility. For the internal nodes in an
organizational structure, the key generation delegation privilege of the parent domain
authority could be delegated to a child domain authority. For the external nodes
(individual users) in an organizational structure, it is the internal nodes which are
the parent of the external nodes to generate the private key for them. The workflow
of the key generation delegation is shown in Figure. 5.5.
Delegation-Internal
Protocol 5.3 is run between a parent domain authority IDP and a child domain
authority IDC to generate the private key for the child domain authority on level i+1
based on that of the parent domain authority on level i. The detailed description is
presented as follows.
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Protocol 5.2 Federated Key Generation
Input: Each TCi has public parameters, the secret share αi, bi, si, and the attribute
set UID and the identity ID of the root organization.
Output: The private attribute key of the root organization.
1: TCi generates ti ∈ Zp.
2: If i = 1, TC1 calculates SK1 and sends it to TC2
3: If i 6= 1, TCi receives SKi−1 and calculates SKi as shown below.
SKi−1 = {K0, La, Lu, Ka, Ku, gbsID, hx, gbt, ht, hbt}x∈UID)
SKi = {K0 ·gαi ·(gb2)ti+1 , La ·(g−s−1ID)ti+1 , Lu ·g−ti+1 , Ka ·(gbsIDhbx)ti+1 , Ku ·(gbIDhx)ti+1 ,
gbt · (gb)ti+1 , ht · (hx)ti+1 , hbt · (hbx)ti+1}
4: If i 6= N , TCi sends the generated components to TCi+1
5: If i = N , TCN sends the generated private key SK to the root authority of
organization ID.
Delegation-External
Protocol 5.4 is run by a domain authority to generate a private key for a user.
The components in the private key of the domain authority are updated as follows.
The integer t′ is a random integer selected by the domain authority.
gαgb
2tu = gαgb
2ta · (gb2)t′ ,
gs
−1
ja tu = gs
−1
ja ta · (gs−1ja )t′ , g−tu = g−ta · g−t′ ,
(gbsjahbx)
tu = (gbsjahbx)
ta · (gbsja · hbx)t
′
,
gbtu = gbta · gbt′ , htux = htax · ht
′
x ,
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Protocol 5.3 Delegation-Internal
Input: Parent DA with identity IDP and attribute set UIDP has private key SKia
shown below.
SKP = {K0 = gαgb2tP , La = g−s
−1
IDP
tP , Lu = g
−tP , Ka = (gbsIDP hbx)
tP ,
Ku = (g
bIDPhx)
tP , gbsID = gbsIDP , hx = hx, gbt = g
btP ,
ht = htPx , hbt = h
btP
x , sIDP }x∈UIDP ,
Output: The private attribute key of the child DA with the identity IDC and at-
tribute set UIDC
1: The components in the private key of the child domain authority are updated
in the following way, where t′ ∈ Zp and x ∈ UIDC
gαgb
2tC = gαgb
2tP · (gb2)t′ ,
g
s−1IDC tC = (g
s−1IDP tP )
sIDP ·s
−1
IDC · (g1/sIDC )t′,
g−tC = g−tP · g−t′ ,
(gbsIDChbx)
tC = (gbtP · gbt′)sIDC · hbtPx · hbt
′
x ,
(gbIDChx)
tC = (gbtP · (gb)t′)IDC · htPx · ht
′
x
gbsIDC = (gb)sIDC ,
gbtC = gbtP · (gb)t′ ,
htCx = h
tP
x · ht
′
x ,
hbtCx = h
btP
x · (hbx)t
′
, sIDC = ID
sIDP
2: The parent DA sends the generated private attribute key to the subdivision.
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Figure 5.5: Flowchart of Key Generation Delegation.
5.3.4 Interoperability Within and Between Organization
When a user needs attributes from two different domain authorities (DA1 and
DA2 ) within an organization or two root authorities (RA1 and RA2) of two different
organizations, the request will finally go to closest common ancestor of these two
authorities. From Protocol 5.2 and Protocol 5.3, there exists a random exponent
in each domain authority’s private key and the user’s private key. Therefore, it is
impossible to generate a private key with attributes from two authorities. To cancel
the random exponent, the common ancestor of the two related authorities has to help
to make the random exponent to be the same, so that all these components could work
together. I choose the closest common ancestor authority but not the root authority
in order to reduce the overheads on the root authority.
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Protocol 5.4 Delegation-External
Input: Domain authority with identity IDa has private key SKa shown below.
SKa = {K0 = gαgb2ta , La = g−s−1IDta , Lu = g−ta , Ka = (gbsIDahbx)ta , Ku = (gbIDhx)ta ,
gbsID = gbsIDa , hx = hx, gbt = g
bta , ht = htax , hbt = h
bta
x , sIDa}x∈UIDa ,
Output: The private attribute key of an individual user with identity IDu and at-
tribute set UIDu .
1: The components in the private key of the child domain authority are updated
in the following way, where t′ ∈ Zp and x ∈ UIDu
gαgb
2tu = gαgb
2ta · (gb2)t′ ,
gs
−1
IDa
tu = (gs
−1
IDa
ta) · (gs−1IDa )t′,
g−tu = g−ta · g−t′ ,
(gbsIDahbx)
tu = (gbta · gbt′)sIDa · hbtax · hbt
′
x ,
(gbIDuhx)
tu = (gbta · (gb)t′)IDu · htax · ht
′
x
2: The DA sends the generated private attribute key to the user.
5.3.5 Identity Revocable Data Sharing and Access Protocol
As shown in Figure. 5.6, the revocation is enforced during encryption. The data
owner would at first construct an access policy tree and then revoke the undesired data
consumers by adding their identities into a revocation identity set. Taking the access
policy, revoked identity set as well as the plaintext data as inputs, the encryption
algorithm outputs the ciphertext to be shared. In this way, only data consumers
whose attributes satisfy the access policy and are not revoked by the data owner can
decrypt the ciphertext by running the decryption algorithm described below.
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Figure 5.6: Flowchart of Identity Revocable Access Control.
Encrypt(PK, (M,ρ),M, ID)
This is an algorithm revoking both multiple users and multiple domain authorities.
The Encrypt algorithm takes as inputs an LSSS access structure (M,ρ), whereM is an
l×n matrix and the function ρ associates each row of M to corresponding attributes.
ID = IDa ∪ IDu and |IDa|+ |IDu| = ra + ru = r. Denote the set of revoked domain
authority identities as IDa = {(ID′a,j)}j∈[1,ra]. The set of revoked user identities is
denoted by IDu = {ID′u,j}j∈[1,ru]. The Encrypt algorithm first chooses a random
vector v = (s, y2, · · · , yn) ∈ Znp . These values will be used to share an encryption
exponent s. For x ∈ [1, l], it calculates λx = v ·Mx. The Encrypt algorithm chooses
random s ∈ Zp. The algorithm chooses random µa, µu such that µ = µa + µu, and
µ′1, · · · , µ′ru ∈ Zp such that µu = µ′1 + · · ·+ µ′ru . The ciphertext is as follows:
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CT = (C,C0, Cˆa, Cˆu, ID), where
C =Me(g, g)αsµ,
C0 = g
sµ,
Cˆa =
(
C∗akj = g
bs−1IDajλkua , C ′ak = (h
b2
ρ(k))
λkua
)j∈Inr
k∈[1,l],IDaj /∈IDa ,
Cˆu =
(
{C∗ukj = gbλku
′
j}k∈[1,l],j∈[1,ru],
{C ′ukj = (gb
2·IDu,jhbρ(k))
λku
′
j}k∈[1,l],j∈[1,ru]
)
,
Decrypt(CT,SK):
CT is the ciphertext with access structure (M,ρ) and SK is a private key for a set
S. Suppose that S satisfies the access structure and let I ⊂ [1, l] be defined as
I = {i : ρ(i) ∈ S}. Let {ωi ∈ Zp}i∈I be a set of constants such that if {λi} are valid
shares of any secret s according to M , then Σi∈Iωiλi = s. For the jth revoked user
identity, denote the identity of the non-revoked domain authority administrating IDu
by IDa,j. The decryption algorithm calculates e(g, g)
b2tsµ′j as follows:
(
∏
i∈I
[e(Kρ(i)u, C
∗
uij) · e(C ′uij, Lu)]ωi)
1
(IDu−IDj) , IDu 6= ID′u,j
Then e(g, g)b
2tsµu could be obtained in the following way:
e(g, g)b
2tsµu =
∏
j∈[1,ru]
e(g, g)b
2tsµ′j .
For the jth revoked domain authority, denote the identity of the domain authority on
the hj
th layer managing IDu by IDa,j. The decryption algorithm evaluates e(g, g)
b2tsµa
as follows:
e(g, g)b
2tsµa =
∏
i∈I
[e(K ′aρ(i), C
∗
aij) · e(La, C ′ai)]ωi .
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If SK’s holder is not managed by any revoked domain authority and is not among
the revoked users, then get e(g, g)αsµ = e(C0,K)
e(g,g)b2tsµu ·e(g,g)b2tsµa can be obtained. Finally
get the message M by evaluating C
e(g,g)αsµ
.
5.4 Analysis and Evaluation
In this section, the ABE scheme proposed in this paper are evaluated in terms of
their computation, storage, and communication performance.
5.4.1 Complexity Analysis
Following the notations provided in TABLE 5.1, I show the complexity analysis
summarized in TABLE 5.2 of the designed scheme. There are four types of time-
consuming operations: pairing, exponentiation, multiplication and inversion, included
in the schemes. Among them, the pairing and exponentiation operations are the dom-
inant costs. Therefore, I utilize the number of pairing and exponentiation operations
as metrics for computation complexity of each scheme. The main storage overhead
comes from the setup algorithm and key generation algorithm.
Since the setup of the master secret key and system public parameters is performed
by all the members of the Trust Coalition, I show the computation complexity for
each of the TC member. Each member will perform one pairing and 2|RI|+ |U |+ 2
exponents. Since each member will send the intermediate result to the next member,
there will be 2|RI|+2|U |+3 elements transmitted from one member to another. After
the system setup, all the TC members will store both the public parameters and the
share of the master secret key. Totally, the storage complexity will be 2|U |+2|RI|+7.
There are two kinds of key generation, the first one is generating private key by
the Trust Coalition for the root authority of each organization. The second is the key
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Table 5.1: Notations.
U the attribute set defined in the system, |U| = m
UID the attribute set of a paritcular domain authority ID
p the prime order of the multiplicative cyclic group G
m the number of attributes defined in the system
Zp Zp = {0, 1, · · · , p− 1}
[1, n] [1, n] denotes a set of integers i.e., {1, 2, · · · , n}
Mx the x
th row of matrix M
l row number in matrix M of an LSSS access structure(
M,ρ
)
H the number of layers in the identity structure tree
rg the number of revoked domain authorities
ru the number of revoked users
S the set of attributes created for a specific user
Ia the set of all the domain authority identities
Inr the set of non-revoked domain authority identities
RI the set of root authorities
N the number of members in the Trust Coaliation
generation by the domain authority within the organization for either child domain
authority or individual users. Since generating delegation private keys for the domain
authorities within an organization is system overall computation overhead, I exclude
it here. The computation complexity of each TC when generating the private key for
the root authority is 2|UID| + 5, where |UID| is the number of attributes of the root
authority. I assume that the height of the identity structure tree is 2, i.e., H = 1.
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The complexity of generating a private key for a user is 2|UIDu | + 4, where UIDu is
the set of attributes assigned to the user.
One pairing computation is performed during the encryption. the number of
exponents is x(3rul+ 2) + y((|Inr|+ 1)l+ 2). If only multiple users are revoked then
x = 1, y = 0; if only multiple domain authorities are revoked then x = 0, y = 1; if there
are both multiple users and multiple domain authorities revoked then x = 1, y = 1.
The communication complexity of the encryption algorithm is x(2lru)+y(1+l|Inr|)+2,
where x and y is the same as above. The computation of decryption consists of
2|I|(ru + 1) pairings and x(|I|ru) + y|I| exponents.
Figure. 5.8 to Figure 5.13 show the experimental performance evaluation of the
algorithms. The algorithms are implemented in python using PBC library on Mac
OS 10.10.5, 1.4 GHz Intel Core i5 and 4 GB 1600 MHz DDR3. I set the number of
revoked identities to 1 and evaluate the relations between the number of attributes
and the computation overhead. The basic hierarchical management structure is shown
as below.
RA1
DA1 DA2 DA3
DA4 DA5
Figure 5.7: An Example of the Organization Structure.
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Figure 5.8: Federated Setup
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Figure 5.9: Federated KeyGen.
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Figure 5.10: Internal Delegation.
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Figure 5.11: External Delegation.
5.4.2 Security Analysis
Security Against Colluding users/Authorities
The proof of security against colluding users and authorities are similar. Because of
the limited spaces, here I just demonstrate the proof for resistance against colluding
data consumers. Assume there are two individual users A and B with private key
SKA and SKB as follows.
SKA = (g
αgb
2tA , La = g
−s−1IDA tA , Lu = g−tA , Ka = (gbsIDAhbx)
t
A, Ku = (g
bIDAhx)
tA ,
gbsID = gbsIDA , hx = hx, gbt = g
btA , ht = htAx , hbt = h
btA
x , sIDA)x∈UIDA ,
SKB = (g
αgb
2tB , La = g
−s−1IDB tB , Lu = g−tB , Ka = (gbsIDBhbx)
tB , Ku = (g
bIDBhx)
tB ,
84
Attribute Number
En
cr
yp
tio
n 
Ti
m
e 
(m
s)
0
250
500
750
1000
1 5 10 15 20
Figure 5.12: Data Encryption.
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Figure 5.13: Data Decryption.
gbsID = gbsIDB , hx = hx, gbt = g
btB , ht = htBx , hbt = h
btB
x , sIDB)x∈UIDB .
tA and tB are two different random integers. Even if A and B put components of
their private key together, they cannot produce a valid private key.
Security Against Colluding TC members
Federated efforts from members in the trust coalition are needed in two processes,
i.e. federated setup and federated key generation for the root authority of each
organization. As discussed, I assume the members in the trusted coalition have benefit
collision and will not collude with each other. Hence the worst situation will be N−1
members collude. Since the final master secret key or the private key contains secret
shares from all the members in the trust coalition, without the remaining honest
member, the N−1 members cannot generate legitimate system parameters or private
keys.
5.5 Summary
In this chapter, to perform the ABE-based Attribute-Based Access Control model
in federated organizations, I propose a new ABE scheme, which supports federation,
delegation, interoperability and identity-based revocation all at once. Compared with
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the ABAC model proposed by NIST, the proposed scheme is lack of environmental
attributes, which might be time, location, etc. In next chapter, I will investigate a
new feature, i.e., attribute expiration, which enables the attribute-based encryption
schemes to involve environment condition, i.e., time, into the access control policy
and attribute distribution.
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Chapter 6
AUTOMATIC ATTRIBUTE EXPIRATION IN ABE
This chapter focuses on the problem of adding a new feature, namely attribute
expiration, into the ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption scheme. By support-
ing this feature, when assigning attributes to users, the trusted authority is capable
to control during what time period the assigned attributes are valid. Only users with
attributes that satisfy the access policy and all these attributes do not expire are
capable to decrypt ciphertexts.
6.1 Background
Ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE) provides fine-grained ac-
cess control over encrypted data. Despite great benefits provided by CP-ABE schemes,
they have not been widely adopted. One of the reasons is that existing solutions lack
an important feature for any practical security solution, i.e., attribute expiration. In
the real-world, users’ attributes should only be effective for a limited time period.
One way to implement this feature is at the protocol level by rekeying periodically.
However, this approach is costly, cumbersome, and inflexible, especially considering
the fact that different attributes can have different periods of validity. Another way to
implement attribute expiration is by leveraging attribute revocation Yu et al. (2010);
Attrapadung and Imai (2009). However, revocation itself is highly inefficient, usually
requires rekeying of all other users, or non-monotonic access policies with negative
attributes Yamada et al. (2014). A time-based approach for attribute expiration is
presented in BSW Bethencourt et al. (2007a). In this approach, the authority simply
appends an expiration date to the attribute string. However, this approach leads
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to a proliferation of attributes, large access policy trees, and significant interaction
overhead between users and the trusted authority.
In this chapter, I propose a new CP-ABE scheme supporting automatic attribute
expiration. I take a decentralized CP-ABE scheme Lewko and Waters (2011) as the
basis. A comparable numerical range is added for each attribute in a private key,
which represents the period of validity. The range is set by an attribute authority for
each attribute when it hands out attribute private keys to users. During encryption,
data owner sets temporal constrains to all the attributes in the access tree. Attributes
are valid for use in decryption if and only if they do not expire. The proposed scheme
is an approach without need of online services. It does not rely on the clock and
enforces expiration according to the current time. Instead, it simply relies on the time
specified by the data owner. To make the attribute management more natural and
efficient, the proposed scheme can be decentralized where multiple trust authorities
can interoperate. The proposed scheme also supports temporal delegation where users
can generate a set or subset of their private attribute key with more constrained time
periods validity that can be temporarily handed off to a third party.
In summary, the proposed scheme provides the following salient features.
• Decentralization: in the access control system, the data owner is able to share
data based on an access control policy written over attributes issued across mul-
tiple authorities in different organizations with different roots of trust. This is
an important feature since in practice, each organization will manage their rele-
vant attributes while access policies could cross organizational boundaries. For
example, an education organization assigns attributes like Professor, Students,
Department of Computer Science, etc, while a medical organization will assign
attributes such as Doctor, Nurse, Department of Emergency, Medicine, etc. A
data owner might want to share data for academic researches by a medical
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school professor and for inspection by doctors in a hospital. The access policy
of this data owner will include attributes from both the education organization
and the medical organization. With this decentralization feature, attribute pri-
vate keys can be distributed by different trust authorities independently while
are still able to interoperate in a secure way.
• Automatic Attribute Expiration: the proposed scheme assigns a time pe-
riod of validity for each attribute during the key generation phase. When the
data owner encrypts data, a temporal value is attached to each attribute in the
access policy tree. In this way, the data owner could make a more fine-grained
access control on the time dimension. For example, a data user with an assigned
attribute “Doctor” with a temporal constrain “From 2011 To 2018” is capable
to decrypt encrypted data with an access policy “Doctor” with temporal con-
straint “2017”, while not capable to decrypt it if the access policy is “Doctor”
with a temporal constraint “2019” when his attribute expired. In this way, a
data user’s attributes will only take effect when its assigned effective time pe-
riod covers the temporal constrain enforced by a data owner. More flexibly, the
data owner can choose not only the current time as the temporal constrain but
also the time in the past and in the future.
6.2 System and Trust Model
Figure. 6.1 shows the system model in a typical cloud file sharing application,
where five types of entities are involved, i.e., the Global Authority, the Data Owner,
the Cloud Server, multiple Attribute Authorities and multiple Users (a.k.a., data
consumers).
The Global Authority (GA) is responsible for generating the global public pa-
rameters GP and publishing them on the cloud server for the other entities in the
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Figure 6.1: System Overview
system to download. The Global Authority also assigns a global unique identifier
GID for each user by signing the global identifier by its private key and sending the
signature to the user by a secure channel. In multiple authority ABE schemes, global
identifiers are significantly important to resist against collusion attacks launched by
multiple users aiming at obtaining unauthorized access. GA is not involved in the
ABE algorithms but just distributes signature of GID. Therefore, GA does not have
any capability of issuing decryption keys.
The Data Owner chooses an access policy and encrypts the data in a hybrid way.
In particular, the data is encrypted by a Data Encryption Key (DEK) of a symmetric
encryption scheme such as AES, and then the ABE scheme will be used to encrypt
the DEK. As shown in Figure. 6.1, K is the DEK used to encrypt the data. The Data
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Owner will upload the access policy, the ABE ciphertext of K and the encrypted data
to the cloud server.
Each Attribute Authority (AA) manages independently a set of attributes Ui(i ∈
[1, N ]) and generates corresponding public attribute keys. Each data user will be
ascribed by a set of attributes based on its identity or role in AA’s management
domain. In the proposed scheme, each attribute authority could manage an unlimited
number of attributes. The mapping between attributes and attribute authorities will
be stored on the cloud server for users’ reference, which I will discuss below. The
attribute authorities will issue private keys to a user based on its attributes and global
identifier. No coordination between attribute authorities is necessary.
The Cloud Server provides the data storage service to the Data Owner, the data
access service to the data users, and also stores the public parameters uploaded by GA
and public attribute keys uploaded by each attribute authorities. Instead of relying
on the cloud server, the access control in the proposed system is enforced “inside the
cryptography”.
The User is ascribed by an attribute set that includes attributes entitled by mul-
tiple attribute authorities. The User’s private key reflects their attributes in each
attribute authorities.
The Cloud Server is regarded to be honest-but-curious, i.e., it will follow the desig-
nated protocols but try to get sensitive information about the stored data by utilizing
the collected data. The global authority is trusted to generate certificates for all the
users in the system. With the global authority, each user will be assigned a unique
global identifier. No coordination between attribute authorities exists. Each author-
ity will be trusted to issue the designated attributes to authorized users. Users are
assumed to be malicious, they might collude to gain authorized data access privileges.
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6.3 Preliminaries
6.3.1 Forward/Backward Derivation Functions
I take use of the definition and notations from Zhu et al. (2012). Let U =
{t1, t2, · · · , tT} denote the countable set of time slots which have total ordering
0 ≤ t1 ≤ t2 ≤ · · · ≤ tT ≤ Z (Z is the maximum value of the time slots). Define two
maps ψ : U → V with V = {vt1 , · · · , vvT } and ψ¯ : U → V¯ with V¯ = {v¯t1 , · · · , ¯vvT }.
Definition 6.1. Forward Derivation Function (FDF) Zhu et al. (2012): A function
is called f : V → V based on a set (U,≤) a forward derivation function if it satisfies
the following conditions
• Easy to compute: given vti , if ti ≤ tj, vtj ← f(vti) can be computed with a
polynomial-time algorithm.
• Hard to invert: given vti , if ti > tj, no polynomial-time algorithm can compute
vtj from vti .
Definition 6.2. Backward Derivation Function (BDF) Zhu et al. (2012): A function
is called f¯ : V¯ → V¯ based on a set (U,≤) a backward derivation function if it satisfies
the following conditions
• Easy to compute: given v¯ti , if ti ≥ tj, v¯tj ← f¯(v¯ti) can be computed with a
polynomial-time algorithm.
• Hard to invert: given v¯ti , if ti < tj, no polynomial-time algorithm can compute
v¯tj from v¯ti .
Construction of the functions in this paper is based on the composite order group
G of RSA-type composite order N = p1p2p3 where p1, p2 and p3 are three large primes.
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The constructions are as follows. φ is a random generator of group G, i.e., φN = 1.
λ, µ ∈ Z∗N with sufficiently large order in Z∗N .
vti ← ψ(ti) = φλ
ti ∈ G
v¯ti ← ψ¯(ti) = φµ
Z−ti ∈ G
6.4 The Proposed Solution
6.4.1 Scheme Syntax
The proposed multiple authority CP-ABE scheme consists of the following basic
algorithms.
• GlobalSetup(λ)→ GP : This algorithm will be run by the global authority.
This algorithm takes as inputs the security parameter λ and outputs global
parameters GP for the system.
• AttributeAuthoritySetup(GP ) → SKi, PKi: This algorithm will be run by
each attribute authority. For each attribute authority AAi (i ∈ [1, N ]), this al-
gorithm takes GP as inputs and outputs its private/public key pair (SKi, PKi).
• KeyGeneration(ATCi, SKi, GID, GP ) → PrivKi,GID: This algorithm will
be run by an attribute authority AAi where i ∈ AAS ⊂ [1, N ]. ATCi is
the description of attributes together with their temporal constrains for the
attribute authority AAi.
• KeyCombination({PrivKi,GID}i∈AAS⊂[1,N ])→ PrivKGID: This algorithm will
be run on the user end, the user obtains private keys from multiple attribute
authorities, she will combine them together and generate an integral private key
denoted by PrivKGID.
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• Encrypt(M, (A, ρ, ATC), GP, {PKi}i∈[1,N ])→ CT : This algorithm takes in a
message M , an access matrix (A, ρ), the set of public keys for relevant au-
thorities, and the global parameters. It outputs a ciphertext CT . The access
policy will include not only attributes but also the temporal constrains on these
attributes.
• Decrypt(CT,GP, PrivKGID): This algorithm takes in the global public pa-
rameters, the ciphertext, and the private attribute keys, which are associated
with the same fixed identity GID. If the collection of attributes and their
temporal constrains satisfy the access policy corresponding to the ciphertext, it
outputs the message M , otherwise it fails.
Correctness Constrains: A multi-authority CP-ABE system is said to be correct
if whenever GP is obtained from the global setup algorithm, CT is obtained from
the encryption algorithm on the message M , and PrivKGID is the private key gen-
erated for user GID and for a set of attributes satisfying the access structure of the
ciphertext, Decrypt(CT,GP, PrivKGID) = M . The same holds for the private key
generated by the Delegation algorithm.
6.4.2 Security Model
The following game between a challenger and an attacker is used to define security
for the proposed attribute expiration CP-ABE scheme. In the game, the adversaries
could query the private keys in an adaptive way. S denotes the set of corrupted
attribute authorities and U denotes the universe of attributes. Similar to Lewko
et al. (2010), for simplicity, I assume each authority only assigns one attribute (in
practice, each authority is able to assign multiple attributes).
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• Setup During this phase the GlobalSetup is run. The adversary defines a set of
corrupted authorities by S ′ ⊂ S. The challenger will get the public/private key
pair for the un-corrupted authorities by running the AttributeAuthoritySetup
algorithm and sending the public keys to the adversary.
• Key Query Phase 1 The adversary specifies tuples (i, ti, GID) and sends
them to the challenger where i denotes a particular attribute managed by an
un-corrupted attribute authority, ti is the corresponding effective time period
for the attribute i and GID is the global identifier. The challenger returns
PrivKi,GID to the adversary.
• Challenge Phase The adversary chooses two messages M0 and M1, an access
matrix (A, ρ) and temporal constrains for each attributes. The variables have
to meet the following requirements. Denote the subset of rows in A labelled by
corrupted attribute authorities’ attributes by V . For each global identifier GID,
VGID denotes the subset of A rows labelled by attributes i that has already been
queried by the adversary. The constrain is that for each global identifier GID,
the subspace spanned by V ∪ VGID is required to not include (1, 0, · · · , 0) or at
least one time period of the quarried attribute does not meet the temporal access
policy. That is, the adversary is required not to ask for a set of private keys
which are able to decrypt. The adversary is required to send the challenger the
public keys for the corrupted attribute authorities whose attributes are included
in the labelling ρ. After this, the challenger chooses a random bit β ∈ {0, 1}
and sends the attacker the ciphertext of Mβ encrypted with the access matrix
(A, ρ) and a selected time point.
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• Key Query Phase 2 In query phase2, the adversary is allowed to submit
more private key queries under the same constrain as described in the Challenge
phase.
• Guess The adversary outputs a guessed bit β′ for β. If β′ = β, the adversary
wins the game, otherwise fails.
The attacker’s advantage in this game is defined to be
Advantage = |Pr[β = β′]− 1
2
|
Definition 6.3. A scheme defined based on the syntax above is secure (against
static corruption of attribute authorities) if no polynomial time adversaries can win
the game with a non-negligible advantage in the security game above.
6.4.3 Construction Overview
The key idea of the construction is to split the shared secret wx in a linear secret
sharing scheme (LSSS) into two parts. One part is for the value of the attribute,
and the other is for the temporal constraint. These two parts together consist of
the integral constraint in an access control policy. The same idea is enforced to the
temporal constraint. One is for the lower bound and the other is for the upper bound.
In this way, when a private entry corresponding to a particular attribute is used, the
decryption algorithm will check not only whether the attributes satisfy the access
policy but also whether their temporal constraints meet the requirement.
6.4.4 Scheme Construction
GlobalSetup(λ) → GP In the global setup, a bilinear group G of order N =
p1p2p3 is chosen. The global public parameters, GP , are N and a generator g1 of Gp1 .
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Figure 6.2: Share of Parameters in the Construction
Additionally, the description of a hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → G that maps global
identities GID to elements of G is also published.
AttributeAuthoritySetup(GP )→ (PK, SK) For each attribute i managed by
the attribute authority, the authority chooses two random exponents αi, yi ∈ Z∗N and
publishes PK = {e(g1, g1)αi , gyi1 } as its public key. It keeps private SK = {αi, .yi} as
its secret key.
KeyGen(GID,ATCi, SK,GP ) → Privi,GID To create a key for GID for at-
tribute ATCi managed by an authority, the authority computes:
Ki,GID = g
αi
1 H(GID)
yi
K<i,GID = g
αi
1 (H(GID)
λti,<φλ
ti,<
)yi , K>i,GID = g
αi
1 (H(GID)
λZ−ti,>φλ
Z−ti,>
)yi
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In this algorithm, the attribute authority will assign both attributes and the re-
lated temporal constraints on them. In practical applications, this interval could be
a set. If that is the case, in the encryption, the ciphertext need to be extended to
support this. I denote the private key as follows:
Privi,GID = (Ki,GID, K
<
i,GID, K
>
i,GID)
Encrypt(M, (A, ρ, ATC), GP, {PK}) → CT The encryption algorithm takes in
a message M , an l × n access matrix A with ρ mapping its rows to attributes, the
global parameters, and the public keys of the relevant authorities. It chooses a random
s ∈ ZN and a random vector v ∈ ZnN with s as its first entry. Let λx denote Ax · v,
where Ax is row x of A. It also chooses a random vector w ∈ ZnN with 0 as its first
entry. Let ωx denote Ax ·ω. For each row Ax of A, it chooses a random rx ∈ ZN . The
current time is denoted by t′c. ATC = t
′
c The ciphertext is computed as
C0 = Me(g1, g1)
s, C1,x = e(g1, g1)
λxe(g1, g1)
αρ(x)rx ,
C2,x = g
rx
1 , C3,x = g
yρ(x)rx
1 g
λZ ·ωx1
1
C3,x,< = g
yρ(x)rx
1 g
ωx2,<·λZ−t′c
1 , C3,x,> = g
yρ(x)rx
1 g
ωx2,>·λt′c
1
C ′3,x,< = g
yρ(x)rx
1 g
ωx1·λZ−t′c
1 , C
′
3,x,> = g
yρ(x)rx
1 g
ωx2·λt′c
1
C4,x,< = φ
λt
′
c , C4,x,> = φ
λZ−t
′
c
ωx1 + ωx2 = ωx, ωx2,< + ωx2,> = ωx2.
Decrypt(CT, {Privi,GID}, GP )→M I assume the ciphertext is encrypted under
an access matrix (A, ρ). To decrypt, the decryptor first computes H(GID). If the
decryptor has the secret keys {Kρ(x),GID} for a subset of rows Ax of A such that
(1, · · · , 0) is in the span of these rows, then the decryptor proceeds as follows. For
each such x, the decryptor computes:
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Ex1 =
C1,x · e(H(GID), C3,x)
e(Kρ(x),GID, C2,x)
= e(g1, g1)
λx · e(H(GID), g1)λZ ·ωx1
Ex2 =
Cλ
t′c−tρ(x),<
1,x · e(H(GID)λt
′
c
, C3,x,<) · e(C4,x,<, C ′3,x,<)
e((K<ρ(x),GID)
λ
t′c−tρ(x),< , C2,x)
= e(g1, g1)
λxλ
t′c−tρ(x),< · e(H(GID), g1)λZ ·ωx2,< · e(φλZ , g1)ωx1
Ex3 =
Cλ
t′c−tρ(x),<
1,x · e(H(GID)λt
′
c , C3,x,>) · e(C4,x,>, C ′3,x,>)
e((K>ρ(x),GID)
λ
tρ(x),>−t′c , C2,x)
= e(g1, g1)
λxλ
tρ(x),>−t′c · e(H(GID), g1)λZ ·ωx2,> · e(φλZ , g1)ωx2
Ex = Ex1 · Ex2 · Ex3
= e(g1, g1)
λx(1+λ
tρ(x),>−tρ(x),< ) · e(H(GID), g1)λZ ·ωx · e(φλZ , g1)ωx
The decryptor then chooses constants cx ∈ ZN such that
∑
x cxAx = (1, 0, · · · , 0)
and computes: ∏
x
(
Ex
)cx
= e(g1, g1)
(1+λ∆)s
(Recall that λx = Ax · v and ωx = Ax · ω, where v · (1, 0, · · · , 0) = s and ω ·
(1, 0, · · · , 0) = 0.) The message can then be obtained as:
M ′ = M (1+λ
∆) = C
(1+λ∆)
0 /
∏
x
(
Ex
)cx
.
M = M ′(1+λ
∆)−1
6.5 Analysis and Evaluation
6.5.1 Security Analysis
To prevent collusion attacks, I use the global identifier to “tie” together the various
attributes belonging to a specific user so that they cannot be combined with another
user’s attributes in decryption. More specifically, the encryption algorithm blinds the
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message M with e(g1, g1)
s, where g1 is a generator of the subgroup Gp1 , and s is a
randomly chosen value in ZN . The value s is then split into shares λx according to the
LSSS matrix, and the value 0 is split into shares ωx. The decryptor must recover the
blinding factor e(g1, g1)
s by pairing their keys for attribute, identity pairs (i, GID)
with the ciphertext elements to obtain the shares of s. In doing so, the decryptor will
introduce terms of the form e(g1, H(GID))
ωx . If the decrytor has a satisfying set of
keys with the same identity GID, these additional terms will cancel from the final
result, since the ωx’s are shares of 0. If two users with different identities GID and
GID’ attempt to collude and combine their keys, then there will be some terms in
the format e(g1, H(GID))
ωx and the other terms in the format e(g1, H(GID
′))ωx , and
they will not cancel with each other, therefore preventing the recovery of e(g1, g1)
s.
The proposed scheme is based on Lewko’s work Lewko and Waters (2011). To
prove the security of the proposed scheme. A simple way is to prove that all the
changes made by the proposed scheme will not harm the original scheme’s security.
The difference between the proposed newly constructed scheme and the basic
decentralized ABE, denoted by DCABE, lie in two parts. The first part is private
key and the second part is the ciphertext.
At first, let’s compare the two schemes’ keys. DCABE’s generated private key is
in the following format:
K ′i,GID = g
αi
1 H(GID)
yi
The proposed scheme is in the following format.
Ki,GID = g
αi
1 H(GID)
yi
K<i,GID = g
αi
1 (H(GID)
λti,<φλ
ti,<
)yi
K>i,GID = g
αi
1 (H(GID)
λZ−ti,>φλ
Z−ti,>
)yi
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The difference is that I keep their part and add two more. In the key generation
part, the most important issue is to keep the master secret key yi and αi secret. It
is easy to verify that the two newly added component will not leak any information
about αi or yi.
Second, let’s compare the two schemes’ ciphertexts or the encrytion algorithm.
The goal of DCABE is that only users with attributes satisfying the access policy
could decrypt the ciphertext. For the proposed scheme, not only the attributes need
to satisfy the access policy, but also these attributes do not expire. The DCABE’s
ciphertext is as follows.
CT =< C0, C1,x, C2,x, C3,x >, where
C0 = Me(g1, g1)
s, C1,x = e(g1, g1)
λxe(g1, g1)
αρ(x)rx ,
C2,x = g
rx
1 , C3,x = g
yρ(x)rx
1 g
ωx
1 ,∀x.
The ciphertext constructed in the proposed scheme is as follows:
C0 = Me(g1, g1)
s, C1,x = e(g1, g1)
λxe(g1, g1)
αρ(x)rx ,
C2,x = g
rx
1 , C3,x = g
yρ(x)rx
1 g
λZ ·ωx1
1
C3,x,< = g
yρ(x)rx
1 g
ωx2,<·λZ−t′c
1 , C3,x,> = g
yρ(x)rx
1 g
ωx2,>·λt′c
1
C ′3,x,< = g
yρ(x)rx
1 g
ωx1·λZ−t′c
1 , C
′
3,x,> = g
yρ(x)rx
1 g
ωx2·λt′c
1
C4,x,< = φ
λt
′
c , C4,x,> = φ¯
λZ−t
′
c
and ωx1 + ωx2 = ωx, ωx2,< + ωx2,> = ωx2.
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I split ωx into ωx1 and ωx2 in a random way. Therefore, the first part of the
ciphterxt shown below:
C0 = Me(g1, g1)
s, C1,x = e(g1, g1)
λxe(g1, g1)
αρ(x)rx ,
C2,x = g
rx
1 , C3,x = g
yρ(x)rx
1 g
λZ ·ωx1
1
will not even disclose the plaintext even if the attributes satisfy the access policy.
The users have to recover the ωx2 by using the temporal part of their private key.
C3,x,> and C3,x,< are only related with wx2, and could not leak any information
about wx.
C ′3,x,> and C
′
3,x,< are in similar format, however the coefficients are different, so
they could not be used together in the decryption according to the generation way
of wx. Therefore, these newly added components will not harm the security of the
DCABE scheme as well.
C4,x,< and C4,x,> are ciphertexts to ensure the temporal constrains. Only when
all users attributes used in the decryption do not expire can they run the backward
and forward function to recover the components used in the decryption. These two
components are unrelated with the DCABE scheme ciphertext, therefore will not
harm the security of the DCABE ciphertext.
There is a requirement on the temporal constrains of each attribute. First, the
assigned valid time for all the attribute could not be the same. The reason is that if
they are all the same, it is easy to get gλ
Z ·ωx
1 , then the temporal constrains will be
effective anymore. The key idea is to avoid the parameters of yρ(x)rx to be the same for
all the attributes. An easy way to deal with this is to add a dummy attribute which
will be assigned to all the users and will be used in all the encryption operations with
an ”AND” gate in the access policy tree.
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Taking all-above analyses into consideration, if the DCABE scheme is secure in
terms of the security model described in 6.4.2, then the constructed scheme is also
secure in terms of that security model. According to Lewko and Waters (2011), the
DCABE scheme is proven to be secure if some hard problems defined in the composite
pairing as I used in this scheme is computationally hard.
6.5.2 Performance Analysis
According to Zhu et al. (2012), the order of the composite pairing have to ensure
the security of the RSA problem, chose type A1 bilinear pairing from JPBC library
with order that is 2048-bits. I implement the scheme with Java and tested the scheme
efficiency on Mac OS 10.10.5, 1.4 GHz Intel Core i5 and 4 GB 1600 MHz DDR3.
Usually, the order of prime order bilinear pairing is 160-bits, and composite bilinear
pairing with each prime being 160-bits. However, in our scheme, to implement the
expiration feature and ensure the security of the FDF and BDF, the parameter is
much larger, thus making the scheme efficiency issues. In this section, the test of
the scheme is performed only with the number of attribute from 1 to 5, and leave
the scheme optimization as future work. I take the following setting when testing
the implementation. First, there is only one attribute authority. Second, all access
policies consist of “AND” gates, which are the most time-consuming access policies.
Third, the maximum time slot Z is set to be 10000000. Fourth,
I test the attribute authority setup algorithm assuming that all the attributes are
managed by a single attribute authority.
6.6 Summary
In this chapter, I propose a new solution to the problem of automatic attribute ex-
piration in the ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption schemes. During private
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Figure 6.3: Attribute Authority Setup.
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Figure 6.5: Data Encryption.
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Figure 6.6: Data Decryption.
key generation phase, the attribute authorities will assign a corresponding expiration
time constraint for each attributes. When a data owner encrypts the data, he or she
will also add a time point for each attribute included in the access policy. Commonly
the time point will be the current time according to how certificate expiration is
checked. In such a way, the proposed scheme can achieve salient features all together,
which cannot be achieved by existing schemes, i.e., decentralization and automatic
attribute expiration. Through security analysis, I show that the proposed scheme is
secure in the defined security model. In the future, I would like to investigate how to
enhance the efficiency of the proposed scheme.
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Chapter 7
DISCRETIONARY ATTRIBUTE-BASED ACCESS CONTROL IN
HYPERLEDGER FABRIC
In this chapter, I will study how to enable discretionary attribute-based access control
in Hyperledger Fabric, which is a popular blockchain platform being used in the
industry. I will describe the workflow of Hyperledger Fabric, its trust framework,
the existing ABAC implementation in Hyperledger Fabric. Then I will present the
motivation of using ABE in Hyperledger Fabric by a simple example. Based on this,
I will describe how to add ABE into the existing trust framework of Hyperledger
Fabric. In addition, I will show how to implement the proposed trust framework and
show how ABE could help provide fine-grained access control over sensitive data in
Hyperledger Fabric by a file-sharing application.
7.1 Hyperledger Fabric
In this section, I show an example system model of a hyperledger fabric applica-
tion. In Figure. 7.1 I show a channel where clients and peer nodes are from three
different organizations, i.e. Organization 1, Organization 2 and Organization 3. For
simplicity, all the clients, peer nodes in the blockchain network is called actors. I
might use actor, participant, and member alternately in the remaining of the pa-
per. The client application, e.g., A1, A2, is an interface a client interacts with the
chaincode (i.e., the software that defines assets in the blockchain and the transaction
instructions to modify or query the status of the asset). It is responsible for submit-
ting a transaction proposal, collecting responses, assembling a formal transaction and
responding to events. There are two types of peer nodes. One is the endorsing peer
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and the other is the validating peer. The endorsing peer is responsible for executing
the transaction proposals received from the client applications and sending back the
executed results. Only when the client application receives responses from a set of
endorsing peers, the validating peers validate the transactions according to the en-
dorsing policy before updating their locally stored ledger. Usually an endorsing peer
is at the same time a validating peer.
Channel: testNet
P1 P2 P1 P2
P1 P2
Organization 1 Organization 2
Organization 3
Ledger
Private
Ledger
Ledger
Private
Ledger
Ledger Ledger
Ledger Ledger
CA1 CA2
CA3
MSP1
MSP2
MSP3           Channel
            Policy
---MSP1
MSP2
MSP3
          PDC
Policy
MSP1
MSP2
AA1
AA3
AA2
S1 S1 S1 S1
S1 S1
A1
A2
Figure 7.1: System Framework
For the channel testNet with channel policy that only members from the aforemen-
tioned three organizations are permitted to join the channel, this subset of members
will create a ledger (denoted by Ledger on this peer node Pi) that is separated from
the other participants. Logically, all the peers will maintain a same copy of the ledger,
which is achieved by way of a consensus protocol. To deal with scenarios where a
subset of organizations on a channel need to keep data private from the others, e.g.,
in the figure, Organization 1 and Organization 2 wants to keep data private from
Organization 3, they will build a private data collection (dented by PDC in the fig-
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ure). On the basis of a PDC policy that only members from Organization 1 and
Organization 2 are able to endorse, commit or query the private data.
For permissionless blockchain systems, there have to be a mechanism for mem-
bership management. In the proposed system framework, I merge the attribute man-
agement into the existing identity or certificate management infrastructure, namely
MSP (i.e., membership service provider). In the existing Fabric framework, the MSP’s
functionality is to define the governing rules of valid identities for an organization,
channel, or blockchain network. In the proposed framework, the MSP will also gov-
ern rules of valid attributes for members who can look into the details of private
transactions.
7.1.1 Terminology Description
• Chaincode: chaincode (i.e., smart contract) is the software that defines objects
(which is denoted by a key-value pair) and the operations to modify the status
of the objects. In Hyperledger, the objects are named assets and the operations
are called transaction instructions.
• Network: The network is the infrastructure that provides the distributed ledger
and the chaincode as well as its API to the client applications. The network is
a peer-to-peer network with nodes called peers.
• Channel: channel is a mechanism allowing a subset of participants to create a
ledger that is separated from the other participants. One channel corresponds
to one ledger.
• Ledger: the copy of ledger located on each peer is the physical ledger, which
consists of key-value pairs. The ledger which is on the right-most side of the
figure is the logical view of the ledger. It represents that all the peers will main-
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tain a same copy of the ledger by way of a consensus protocol. In Hyperledger
Fabric, the consensus algorithm is a pluggable module, where an orderer will
collect all the transactions and send them in ordered blocks.
• Client: client application is the interface a client interacts with the chaincode.
It is responsible for submitting a transaction proposal, collecting the responses,
assembling a formal transaction and responding to events.
• Peer: there are two types of peer nodes. One is the endorsing peer and the
other is the validating peer. The endorsing peer is responsible for executing the
transaction proposals received from the client applications and sending back
the executed results. The client application receives responses from a set of
endorsing peers (the group of endorsing peers satisfy an endorsing policy defined
by a boolean formula). The validating peers validate the transactions according
to the endorsing policy before updating their locally stored ledger. Usually an
endorsing peer is at the same time a validating peer.
• Orderer: orderers are also named as ordering service nodes. These nodes form
the ordering service of Hyperledger. They work on establishing the total order
of all the transactions within the system.
All the participants above are named an actor in Hyperledger. I might use actor,
participant and members exchangeably in the remaining of this paper.
7.1.2 Identity Management
Unlike permissionless blockchain platforms where trust is established by a resource-
consuming consensus protocol, in permissioned blockchain trust is established by
identifying all the participants including the clients, peer nodes, the orderers.
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• Identities: in Hyperledger, a digital identity is encapsulated in an X.509 digital
certificate. The identity of a participant determines what resources it can access.
• Attributes: properties of an actor, for example, its organization, organizational
unit, role, profession, etc. Identity and attribute are unified to be principal in
Hyperledger.
• Membership Service Provider (MSP): MSP’s functionality is to define the gov-
erning rules of valid identities for an organization, channel, or blockchain net-
work. In another word, MSP converts actor’s verifiable identities (X.509 certifi-
cate) into roles (or members).
• Organization: an organization is defined to be a managed group of members.
The concept of organization here is different from that in an X.509 certificate.
Each organization will have a local MSP for membership and access control
management.
• Membership Service: it assigns identifiers for both peers and client applications.
In the system, it is composed of two parts. The first part works on certificate
management in PKI and the second part is on attribute management, such as
attribute assignment, validation and attribute-based encryption related infras-
tructures.
• Auditors: auditors are responsible for system logs.
7.1.3 System Workflow
Before digging into detailed design of data protection mechanism, I firstly intro-
duce how the data flow among the multiple system components.
I divive the workflow into two phases, i.e., Proposal & Packaging and Validation
& Updating.
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Proposal & Packaging
1. A client submits a transaction proposal to the endorsing peers.
2. The endorsing peers execute the code associated to the transaction, generate
the read-write set and sign the result.
3. The signed result is sent back to the client.
4. The client collects a sufficient number of endorsements so that the endorsement
policy can be satisfied.
5. The client broadcasts the transaction to the orderers.
6. The orderers collect transactions, order them chronologically and create a signed
block.
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- Enc : ABE ciphertext
Figure 7.2: Transaction Workflow1: Proposal and Packaging
Validation & Updating
1. The orderers distribute the new block to all the peers (including both endorsing
and committing peers).
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2. The endorsing and committing peers execute the validation of the transactions
contained in the received block; they do two verifications: first, if the read-write
set is coherent with the current state of the ledger; second, if the endorsement
policy has been satisfied.
3. The client is notified of the result of execution of the transaction.
Figure 7.3: Transaction Workflow2: Validation and Updating
The transaction described above include both the deployment transaction and the
invocation transaction. The deployment transaction will be submitted at the chain-
code deployment phase. This transaction will be submitted only once. After the
chaincode is installed and initialized on the peer nodes, client applications invoke the
functions by constructing and submitting invocation transactions. Without privacy
protection, the transactions will be public to all the members on the channel. Access
control should be enforced when sending chaincode query requests. The goal is that
only authorized users are able to access private information, e.g., invoked chaincode
function, arguments, and the responses.
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7.2 Trust Framework
In this section, I summarize the trust framework of Hyperledger Fabric and add
the attribute-based encryption related modules into the framework.
Based on its original workflow, I show how the added modules AV C and KGC
could work together.
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Figure 7.4: Trust Framework in Hyperledger Fabric
To create an access control policy in Hyperledger Fabric, the most important part
is user’s identities and how they are managed in the system, i.e., the trust frame-
work in Hyperledger Fabric. In Hyperledger Fabric, the trust in built on public key
infrastructure. Each organization might have their certificate authority to distribute
certificates for their managed members. As shown in Figure 7.4, there are three types
of certificate authorities, i.e., Enrollment Certificate Authority (ECA), Transaction
Certificate Authority (TCA) and Attribute Certificate Authority (ACA).
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• ECA: ECA is responsible for new user registration. During the registration,
ECA will generate a certificate for a user. The certificate includes user’s identity.
• TCA: To achieve transaction anonymity and unlinkability, Hyperledger Fabric
also provides the TCA for deploying and invoking chaincode. Each user can
request multiple transaction certificates. The transaction certificate is indepen-
dent of user’s identity information, thus preserving user’s privacy.
• ACA: It is responsible for certifying users’ owernship of attributes and main-
taining a database for all the users and their assigned attributes, including ID,
Affiliation, Attribute Name/Value, and the valid time period.
Besides the aforementioned three certificate authorities, in the proposed frame-
work I also introduce two components for attribute-based encryption, i.e., Key Gen-
eration Center (KGC) and Attribute Validation Center (AVC).
• KGC: this component is responsible for generating and publishing crypto algo-
rithm related parameters, and creating attribute private key for a user.
• AVC: the Attribute Authority component takes the responsibility of users’ at-
tribute validation and endorsement and distribute certificate for users to prove
their ownership of attributes.
7.3 Attribute-Based Access Control in Hyperledger Fabric
Figure 7.4 summarizes the workflow of how the identity and attribute management
system distributes certificates and private attribute keys to members. This procedure
can be split into three phases, i.e., enrollment certificate distribution, transaction
certificate distribution and private attribute key distribution.
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Attribute Certificate Distribution
• v1: the user sends request for attribute certificates. The request includes the
materials that could be used to prove the identity, attributes of the user.
• v2: the attribute validation centers generate attribute certificates for the user
and send them back the user.
Enrollment Certificate Distribution
• e1: User → ECA, a user sends an enrollment certificate request to the enroll-
ment certificate authority.
• e2: the enrollment certificate authority generates an enrollment certificate for
the user.
• e3: ECA → User, the ECA sends the created certificate to the user.
• a1: ECA→ ACA, after distributing the enrollment certificate to the user, ECA
will send the certificate to the attribute certificate authority.
• a2: ACA will update the database of user identity and attributes storage.
Transaction Certificate Distribution
• t1: User → TCA, the user requests a batch of transaction certificates based
on its application requirements. The request will include the number of desired
transaction certificates, the assigned enrollment certificate, the attribute names
to be used.
• t2: TCA → ACA, upon receiving the request from the user, the transaction
certificate authority will generate a signed request which includes the user’s
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enrollment certificate and attribute names and send the request to the attribute
certificate authority.
• t3: ACA will query the database and check whether the user is assigned the
requested attributes. If the user has part or all of the requested attributes,
the attribute certificate authority will generate an attribute certificate which
includes the user’s attributes name and corresponding value as well as the en-
rollment certificate. Otherwise, ACA will generate an error message.
• t4: ACA→ TCA, based on the query result of the user’s attributes, ACA sends
either an attribute certificate or an error message to the transaction certificate.
• t5: TCA → User, the transaction certificate authority checks whether the at-
tributes contained in the attribute certificate is valid or not and sends the
generated transaction certificates to the user.
Private Attribute Key Distribution
• k1: User → KGC, the user with the transaction certificate sends the private
attribute key request to the key generation center. The request includes both
the user’s identity, attributes, as well as the attribute certificates obtained from
the AVC.
• k2: KGC→ User, the key generation center verifies the user’s attribute certifi-
cate and generates the private attribute keys for the user and sends them back
to the user.
Note 1. I will not change the workflow marked by ai, ei and ti as designed by the
Hyperledger Fabric.
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Figure 7.5: An Example Enrollment Certificate
The blockchain platform itself provides a way to implement attribute-based access
control 1. The access control decisions are made by the chaincode on the basis of an
1https://tinyurl.com/y6a5uyju
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identity’s attributes. To enable this, the platform proposed to add one or more
attribute name and value into an identity’s enrollment certificate. When this identity
is used to call functions in the chaincode, the attribute’s value will be extracted
to make the attribute-based access control decision. As shown in Figure 7.5, the
common name of the certificate is the example user “user1”. It was assigned an
attribute “carmake” with the value “Toyota”. Within the chaincode, the following
Figure 7.6 shows how access control logic is added.
Figure 7.6: Attribute-Based Access Control in Hyperledger Fabric
The mechanism implemented in Hyperledger Fabric can only achieve attribute-
based access control on the chaincode level. All the car owners or data uploaders will
use the same access policy. In this example is that it is only the identity with the
value of the attribute “carmaker” to be “Toyota”. The example user “user1” could
query the API in the chaincode. What if a new user joins the system and wants a
new access policy, such as the value of the attribute “carmaker” is “Ford”? Within
the current attribute-based access control mechanism in Hyperledger Fabric, it is very
difficult to change if not impossible.
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7.4 ABE-based ABAC in Hyperledger Fabric
To enable discretionary ABAC in Hyperledger Fabric, I propose to integerate ABE
into the blockchain platform. The following summarizes the implementations.
7.4.1 ABE Toolkit
I implement the ABE scheme proposed in Chapter 5. The provided APIs include:
global parameter generation, federated setup, federated key generation, delegated key
generation, encryption, and decryption. Since the chaincode is written in multiple
programming languages, I implement a local agent for dealing with the programming
language gap issue.
7.4.2 Hybrid Encryption
To enable hyprid encryption, I provided APIs for encrypting any string, which
includes the symmetric key of AES, password, or any secret messages. To enable file
encryption, I implement a file encryption/decryption toolkit. The ciphertext format
would be, the ABE will be used to encrypt the password or symmetric key, and then
the password or symmetric key will be used to encrypt a longer message or files.
7.4.3 Attribute Validation Authority
I selected the signature scheme in Boneh et al. (2001, 2003) to implement the
attribute authority. The following is the description of the scheme.
• Key Generate: Run on the attribute authority end. For a particular attribute
authority, select randomly x← Zp, and compute v ← gx. The AA’s public key
is v ∈ G. The attribute authority’s secret key is x ∈ Zp.
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• Sign: For a particular attribute authority, given the secret key x ∈ Zp and a
message M ∈ {0, 1}∗, compute h ← H(M), where h ∈ G, and σ ← hx. The
signature is σ ∈ G. H denotes a hash function which maps an arbitrary binary
message to an element in G.
• Verify: Given an attribute authority’s public key v, a message M , and a
signature σ, compute h ← H(M); the verification succeeds if the equation
e(g, σ) = e(v, h) holds;
The implemented attribute authority provides services in the way of restful API.
An example request is in the following format.
{
”aaID”:”1”,
”userGID”:”qdong11”,
”attributes”:”attr3,attr4”
}
7.4.4 ABE in Chaincode
Figure 7.7 describes the workflow of using attribute-based encryption to protect
sensitive data stored in the blockchain applications.
• Step 1: The user request attribute certificates from multiple attribute authori-
ties. The certificates associates the user’s identifier with its attributes.
• Step 2: The user sends the private attribute request to the key generator.
The request includes the attribute certificates of the user. Note that the key
generation center is just an abstract description. It could be in a hierarchical
structure as described in Chapter 5.
119
AA1
AAm
.
.
. 1
1
KGC
2
3
5 6
4 7
Figure 7.7: Workflow of the Demo System
• Step 3: The KGC will verify the use’s attributes. If the verification succeeded,
the corresponding private attribute key will be distributed to the user. Other-
wise, the request will fail.
• Step 4: As a data owner, to upload the sensitive file. At first, the file needs
to be encrypted and uploaded to the IPFS Benet (2014) to get the hash value
which could be used to download the file. Then the data owner will run the
ABE encryption scheme to encrypt both the symmetric key or password used
to encrypt the file and the hash value.
• Step 5: upload the ABE ciphertexts and the other metadata related with the
file to the blockchain application.
• Step 6: Whenever a user searched the blockchain to find interested file, the
chaincode will return the non-sensitive metadata as well as the ABE ciphertext.
The user will at first check whether its attributes, identity satisfy the access
policy enforced over the data, and then decrypt the ABE ciphertext to get the
hash value and password or symmetric key.
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• Step 7: The user will download the file from the IPFS file system by using the
decrypted hash value. Then the user decrypts the file by running file decryption
toolkit with the encrypted file and the decrypted password or symmetric key as
inputs. Finally, the user gets access to the sensitive data.
I modified the chaincode Fabcar used in the Hyperledger Fabric to demonstrate
attribute-based access control to show how ABE is used. The Fabcar application uses
Hyperledger Fabric to store users’ car information, including car color, car making
company, etc.. I change the the field owner to include sensitive information about
the car’s owner or the car itself. I assume the sensitive information is stored in a file
system named IPFS Benet (2014). When uploading the file to the system, a hash
value will be generated. In the later time, a data user with the hash value could
download the file.
To protect the sensitive file, the ABE scheme needs to provide protection over
both the file’s hash value and the symmetric key or passed used to encrypt the file.
Therefore, when the user call the chaincode API to upload sensitive data, before
uploading, the data would be encrypted. The following is an example file encryption
request and the generated ciphertext.
Figure 7.8: Example File Encryption Request
Compared with the previous data uploading, this time it is the ABE ciphertext
being uploaded but not the plaintext message.
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Figure 7.9: Example File Encryption ABE Ciphertext (Some Information Hidden for
Space Limitation)
Figure 7.10: Upload the ABE Protected Sensitive Message to Blockchain
When the user queries the data, it will be capable to download the data and then
decrypt locally by calling the file decryption API.
7.5 Summary
In this chapter, I investigate the workflow of Hyperledger Fabric, how it achieves
the goal of permissioned blockchain, how it performs the attribute-based access con-
trol model within chaincode. I find the access control is chaincode-level and is too
coarse. Therefore, I propose to add new modules into the trust framework of Hy-
perledger Fabric to enable ABE-based ABAC. I do implementation of attribute au-
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thorities, message/file encryption/decryption toolkit, ABE toolkit and also show the
whole workflow by an example chaincode application Fabcar.
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Chapter 8
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this thesis, I propose three CP-ABE schemes. The first CP-ABE scheme is named
DUR-CP-ABE, that is discretionary user revocation ciphertext-policy attribute-based
encryption scheme. I identify each user by way of a hierarchical identity, which in-
cludes information of the hierarchical organization. In this way, to revoke a group of
users affiliated with an organization, I could revoke the organization directly without
revoking all the users individually, thus reducing both computation and communi-
cation overheads. The second scheme expands the DUR-CP-ABE in terms of key
management. It provides new features including federation, delegation and inter-
operability. The federation solves the problem of single point of trust and failure
issue. No single trusted authority owns the master secret key, while multiple trusted
authorities have to work together in a federated way to generate the public parame-
ters. Delegation enables the key generation to follow the organization’s layered man-
agement structure. Inter-operability enables a user to get private key from different
subdivisions.
To enable attribute expiration, I propose an ABE scheme that supports auto-
matic attribute expiration. Different from the existing solutions where interactions
are needed, the proposed scheme is non-interactive. The scheme provides the features
including decentralization, automatic attribute expiration and temporal delegation.
By decentralization, a user could get attributes from multiple authorities. By auto-
matic attribute expiration, I embed a time period for each attribute assigned to the
user, thus only when the attributes satisfy the access policy and do not expire when
the encrypted data is shared can the user decrypt the ciphertext.
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Considering that most existing work on applying attribute-based encryption is
on cloud computing, I propose a framework for using attribute-based encryption in
hyperledger fabric. I implement an attribute authority for distributing attributes
for users. I implement the attribute-based encryption toolkit for the whole system
setup, private key generation, data encryption and data decryption. I implement
a file encryption/decryption toolkit which could work together with attribute-based
encryption to perform hybrid encryption.
With the proposed attribute-based encryption enabled attribute-based access con-
trol model, fine-grained discretionary access control could be achieved but not the
chaincode-level coarse access control. To demonstrate the whole workflow of using
attribute-based encryption in hyperledger fabric, I set up a simulated hyperledger
fabric network, modified a Fabcar chaincode which is used in fabric’s documentation
to show attribute-based access control. The demo showed the workflow of how a user
gets attribute certificates from multiple attribute authorities, how the key generator
verifies the attributes and generates the private key for the user when the validation
succeeded, how a data owner uploaded encrypted secrets (which will be used to de-
crypt the sensitive file), how a user query the desired data and get the ciphertext,
perform decryption to get the secret, and finally get access to the sensitive file.
There are some very interesting future work. ABE schemes are constructed based
on pairing, which makes it less efficient compared with other public key encryption
schemes used in practice. When more functionalities are added into the scheme,
efficiency becomes even worse. Therefore, it is very important to further investigate
how to optimize the scheme either in terms of implementation or algorithm design.
Attribute-based encryption is a special category of functional encryption Boneh
et al. (2011). The function in attribute-based encryption is to evaluate whether a set
of attributes associated with a user’s private key satisfy the access policy described
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by a boolean formula associated with the ciphertext. If the attributes satisfy the
access policy, the output will be the plaintext message. With functional encryption,
the user will be assigned a private key based on the function, say f that he wants to
evaluate over the message. The decrypted plaintext is not the message but f(x). If
f is a predicate function, one application could be intrusion detection over encrypted
data. The network payloads might be very sensitive and could not be shared with
other entities, functional encryption enables data user to get known of the checking
result but not the data themselves. This might also be used in medical applications,
such as gene testing.
With attribute-based encryption, any user is allowed to be a data sender. This
makes it possible for some users to send malicious data to the receiver. Therefore, it
is significant to verify the identity of a data sender. Existing Attribute-Based Signa-
ture Li et al. (2010) could be used to perform attribute-based authentication where
a user who was assigned a set of attributes is capable to prove the ownership of these
attributes. In some application scenarios, not only a user’s attributes but also its
identity needs to be verified before decrypting the data sent by this user. It is inter-
esting to construct a scheme supporting attribute-based identification, authentication
and authorization all in one.
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